Undergraduate student

McGill University, Canada

Strait of Hormuz and the 2026 Iran Crisis

 Introduction

 Control over strategically important maritime communications and straits has always mattered for both national and international security. They connect states with other regions, as well as ensure the development of world trade; a significant part of vital goods for living are transported by sea, including energy resources, food, and industrial raw materials, on which the stable functioning of the global economy depends. Even with developments in technology and the development of alternative transport routes, many sea straits still retain their exceptional geopolitical significance. A lot of major trade flows pass through them, for example, oil and natural gas supplies from the Persian Gulf countries. Therefore, any security violations on these routes can affect not only the economic stability of an individual state, but also the international system as a whole. In this regard, it becomes clear that sovereign states and the international community must ensure the safety of maritime communications.

There are several straits of special strategic importance in the world. These include the Straits of Malacca and Bab el-Mandeb, the Strait of Gibraltar, the Bosporus and the Strait of Hormuz. The most important maritime transport corridors pass through them, the closure of which can have the most negative consequences for the movement of trade, energy, and military flows. But the purpose of the article is to focus specifically on the Strait of Hormuz.

Hormuz’s geographical location connects the Persian Gulf with the Indian Ocean and provides transportation of a significant part of the world’s energy resources. According to U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), oil flow through the strait averaged 20 million barrels per day (b/d), or the equivalent of about 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption (2025). Because of its large share, any threats to navigation’s freedom in the region inevitably acquire an international character and go far beyond the regional conflict.

The events of 2026 made this dependence more visible. After the military escalation involving Iran, Israel, and the United States, the Strait of Hormuz has once again become the focus of international attention. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report highlights that “the resulting ripple effects go far beyond the region, affecting energy markets, maritime transport and global supply chains” (2026, p. 2). The consequences have spread far beyond the Middle East, affecting the functioning of the global economy.

Overall, the events of 2026 raise a bigger question: why does such a small area have so much influence over states behavior and the development of international crises? Hormuz shows that strategic geography continues to shape international politics. This paper argues that the crisis has once again demonstrated the role of the Strait of Hormuz as one of the key geopolitical hubs of the modern world. Its importance comes not only from the significant volumes of global energy supplies that pass through it, but also through its location, influence on regional security, diplomacy, and ability to influence policy of states during instability.

Understanding the Strategic Importance

The strategic importance is formed by economic, geographical, and military-political factors. From an economic perspective, a very noticeable part of world trade of oil and gas passes through it. Geographically, it is a narrow strait, making it very hard to find alternate equal water passageways. Finally, in military and political terms, the strait gives states located next to it the opportunity to influence freedom of navigation and decisions of other countries. Thus, the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz is determined by a combination of geographical, geo-economic, military-political and logistical factors.

The Strait of Hormuz runs between Iran and Oman, connecting the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. Thus, the Strait is considered to be the main access to world markets for most states of the Persian Gulf. At its narrowest point, the Strait is 21 miles wide, but the width of the shipping lane in either direction is only two miles, separated by a two-mile buffer zone (EIA, 2012). The Strait is deep and wide enough to handle the world’s largest crude oil tankers, with about two-thirds of oil shipments carried by tankers in excess of 150,000 deadweight tons (EIA, 2012). Such a system makes it possible to streamline the movement of tankers in peacetime, but still makes the strait especially vulnerable in times of crisis. Since the ships there have a clear pre-prepared schedule, a certain transport corridor, maneuvering, choosing an alternative route after such planning is difficult and almost impossible. Indeed, even if there is an accident, for example, its deliberate blocking or damage to the port infrastructure, it can significantly reduce the ability of other vessels to move. Even though several alternatives are potentially available to move oil from the Persian Gulf region without transiting Hormuz, they are limited in capacity, in many cases are not currently operating or operable, and generally engender higher transport costs and logistical challenges (EIA, 2012). Hence, narrowness brings more vulnerability both militarily and politically. To disrupt navigation even just a limited attack, threat or force can slow down the movement of ships and cause international consequences.

The location of the coastline and islands around the strait is of additional importance. Iran occupies the northern coast of Hormuz and controls a number of islands located near the main shipping routes. As highlighted in The Strategic Importance of the Strait of Hormuz and Its Impact on the Iranian-American Conflict, “such a location gives Iran a comparative advantage that the United States lacks” (Esmael et al., 2020, p. 339) . This advantage is due to the proximity of the Iranian territory and naval forces to a narrow shipping corridor. Still, it doesn’t mean that Iran has full control over it. Instead, it is more about the chance of creating risks for passing vessels and increasing the potential cost of intervention for external forces.

Geopolitical Intelligence Services Reports study helps to understand the military side of controlling straits. It argues that the deployment of naval bases near such spaces gives states the opportunity simultaneously ensuring free passage for a country’s own vessels, and creating the potential to block adversaries (GIS, 2026). This shows that the control over the sea passage can have both defensive and offensive functions. Therefore, the Strait of Hormuz is not only a route for transporting energy resources, but also a space where issues of trade, security and distribution of power intersect. This connection can be further explained with the help of the concept of sea power. It is useful to address the difference between the existing potential and the actual political result of its use. In The Concept of Sea Power research paper, the sea power is defined both as the availability of naval resources and the ability to use them to influence the behavior of other states: “sea power must be defined as input, that is the sum of the various naval and maritime-related assets, as well as output, that is, the ability to influence the behavior of other actors” (Till, 2009, as cited in Albrecht et al., p. 3). In simple words, the state might have maritime forces like weapons, personnel, ports and other infrastructure. However, ‘the result and importance’ here is understood as whether they can influence the behavior of other states. Just like that, even if the Strait of Hormuz will not actually close, a credible threat of disruption can already force other states to take measures to protect supplies, reconsider foreign policy calculations, or begin negotiations. It is an instrument of political pressure.

At the same time, a favorable geographical location does not itself guarantee political or military superiority. Summarizing Mahan’s principles, the authors of The Concept of Sea Power note: “the strategic value of a place is defined by the position/situation, the military strength (offensive/defensive), and the resources available at the place. He sees the central position as a supporting element that exists alongside many other supporting elements. Thus, the benefit of a central position is very limited when there is a stronger enemy on both sides” (Albrecht et al., pp. 7-8). In other words, the advantage for central position remains only in combination with the forces, resources and infrastructure that allow it to be used. So Iran’s proximity to the shipping routes of the strait of Hormuz does not amount to absolute control over them. It is important to have naval forces, coastal missile systems, island infrastructure, and the ability to deploy mines, because those increase Iran’s ability to pose risks to international shipping. Geography provides potential advantage, but it turns into a useful instrument when the state has financial capabilities to use it properly in their interests.

 Historical Background

 Key historical events show how the threat to shipping became part of the political and military confrontation. As Caitlin Talmadge points out: “even if the strait were not closed in the sense of being physically barricaded, military conflict in the area could cause prices to skyrocket in anticipation of a supply disruption—and to remain high until markets could be assured that the flow of commerce had been restored” (2008, p. 82). In other words, completely blocking the strait is not necessary for international consequences to occur. Even individual attacks, naval mines, detention of ships, or threat of military clash can have an impact on transportation, cause price increases, and attract external naval forces to the region.

The first major event was the Tanker War, the naval phase of the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 that began in 1984. Iraq attacked tankers related to the export of Iranian oil, because they wanted to cut Teheran’s revenues. Iran, in turn, retaliated by attacking Iraq’s ships and its supporting states like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. As a result, merchant shipping became part of the war (Roos, 2026).

The threat to oil transportation led to direct intervention by the United States. The historical review of the events notes: “In 1988, an Iranian mine damaged the USS Samuel B. Roberts, a naval frigate on escort duty in the Persian Gulf” (Roos, 2026). In response, the US conducted Operation Praying Mantis, attacking Iranian ships and naval facilities. Later that year, the American cruiser USS Vincennes mistakenly shot down Iran Air Flight 655, killing all 290 people on board. These all gradually intensified the direct confrontation between Iran and the US.

Iran didn’t completely block the Strait of Hormuz and the main fighting wasn’t directly inside it. Talmadge highlights that Teheran has shown some restraint as Iran itself was dependent on the Strait of Hormuz. The complete closure of the route would have meant that they would be deprived of oil revenues and almost inevitably cause large-scale external interference. Complete closure was not necessary to create serious risks and force external states to change their behavior. Talmadge poses the main military-political problem: “the question is whether Iran can harass shipping enough to prompt U.S. intervention in defense of the sea-lanes” (Talmadge, 2008, p. 84). The main aim is to create a level of danger at which external states will be forced to intervene.

In the late 2000s and early 2010s, a similar situation happened. In 2008, Iran said it could block the strait if international sanctions were not lifted. Similar warnings were voiced after the European Union imposed an embargo on Iranian oil in 2012. The United States, Britain, and France have sent aircraft carriers and other warships through the strait, showing their willingness to protect freedom of navigation. However, Iran has not implemented its threat (Roos, 2026). As noted by historian Rudolf Matthee, similar confrontations have occurred before: “There have been standoffs like this since the Iranian Revolution when the regime came into power” (as cited in Roos, 2026).

In 2019, tensions shifted from threats to a series of real-life incidents. Though not all of them were directly in the strait. The May attacks, for instance, took place off the coast of the UAE, and the June attacks were in the Gulf of Oman. Still, they affected the safety of the entire route between the Persian Gulf and the open sea. On May 12th, four commercial vessels were damaged in explosions off the coast of the UAE. However, the culprit has not been officially identified: “The inquiry blamed an unidentified state actor. The US has accused Iran of responsibility, but Iran denies involvement” (Wintour, 2019). The uncertainty increased the risks and fears that the same situation might happen again.

On June 13th, tankers Front Altair and Kokuka Courageous were damaged in the Gulf of Oman, one ship caught fire, the other suffered hull damage, and the crews were evacuated. The United States presented a video that, according to them, showed an Iranian military boat next to one of the damaged ships. Iran denied the accusations and stated that the incident could have been an attempt to provoke an armed clash (Wintour, 2019).

In July, the crisis continued directly in the strait. It happened when Iranian forces detained the British oil tanker Stena Impero since British Marines stopped an Iranian tanker near Gibraltar. Tehran’s actions were widely viewed as a retaliatory measure, although Iran officially attributed the detention to a violation of shipping regulations. Rather than blocking the movement of all ships, Iran used their proximity of forces to the main shipping lanes to respond to Britain’s actions (Roos, 2026).

The crisis of 2026 continued this pattern, but expanded this scale. The restriction of shipping, this time, became a direct part of the war and negotiations with the United States. The International Crisis Group highlights: “Tehran’s influence over the strait is a tremendous source of leverage in its negotiations with the U.S. to end the war” (2026). The United States, in turn, imposed a blockade on Iranian ports to restrict oil exports and force Teheran to ease restrictions on shipping. Both sides used maritime communications as a means of economic and political pressure on each other.

 2026 Crisis and the return of Hormuz

 After the start of the US and Israel military operation against Iran on February 28, 2026, the strait once again became a centre of international conflict. And this time restrictions became widespread. On March 2, an Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps official said, “The strait (of Hormuz) is closed. If anyone tries to pass, the heroes of the Revolutionary Guards and the regular navy will set those ships ablaze (as cited in Brown at al., 2026). And beginning on March 4th, 2026, Iranian forces have officially closed the strait and launched attacks on ships trying to pass through it. Iran began to form its own traffic control system: it required prior permission and discussed the introduction of transit fees. The conditions of access varied: states that maintained working relations with Teheran could negotiate passage, while ships associated with the United States and Israel were not allowed.

The memorandum to reach a common ground between sides on June 17, partially allowed the resumption of transportation, but did not resolve the dispute over who should determine the conditions of passage. If now an average of 28 ships pass the strait, before the war it was about 100. By mid-July, the attacks resumed, and only on July 14, the US restored the blockade of Iranian ports. There were more than 20 American warships and hundreds of aircraft in the region. The unclear wording of the memorandum allowed both sides to accuse each other of violating the agreement. “What was supposed to be a bridge from war to diplomacy has instead become another battlefield, with both sides using force to try to impose their own reading of the agreement’s ambiguous terms,” the International Crisis Group, a think tank that advocates to prevent war, said in a newsletter on the issue Tuesday (2026). The United States’ military superiority did not mean that they could quickly restore commercial traffic. This is because to stop trade, Teheran did not need to physically block every shipping lane. By giving a way to pass to some of the oil ships, Teheran kept part of the income and at the same time increased the costs for the opponents.

 Regional and Global Implications

 The consequences of the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz have affected several areas at once. They have affected energy security, international trade, the situation in the Persian Gulf, and the global economy as a whole. Therefore, this crisis cannot be considered only as a regional problem.

The crisis has created a double threat for the Gulf States. They depended on the American military presence and freedom of navigation, but at the same time they feared that increased US actions would lead to retaliatory Iranian strikes on their territory, ports and energy infrastructure. These concerns intensified after the attacks on American facilities in Kuwait and Bahrain. This has further increased instability in the region. Even a separate armed incident between Iran, the Gulf states, or external forces could lead to a more serious regional conflict.

The countries of the region have also begun to actively protect alternative routes. Saudi Arabia has proposed the creation of a multinational maritime coalition to protect shipping and energy routes in the Red Sea. At the same time, it redirected part of the oil through the East–West pipeline to the ports of the Red Sea. Rerouting oil through the East-West pipeline to Red Sea ports has limited the drop in oil deliveries, while higher oil prices have more than offset volume losses, generating an oil revenue windfall (International Monetary Fund [IMF], 2026).

Oman has proposed a model based on the experience of the Strait of Malacca. It allowed for voluntary payments for navigation services, but not mandatory transit fees. Speaking at a meeting of the International Maritime Organization council on Thursday in London, the Oman delegate Khamis bin Mohammed Al Shamakhi said: “The right of transit passage through straits used for international navigation is guaranteed under international law and does not support the imposition of transit fees on vessels passing through the strait of Hormuz” (Wintour & Christou, 2026).

European States have also considered this model. The UK opposed mandatory fees, but allowed payment for specific services related to traffic safety. Qatar has taken a tougher stance, fearing that recognizing Iran’s special powers will make the countries of the region dependent on Tehran’s political decisions. Qatar’s foreign ministry spokesperson, Majed al-Ansari, said: “Giving the Iranians sovereignty over the strait in a way that contradicts international maritime law will be basically agreeing to be hostages to whatever radical element that wants to take over the strait at any time”(Wintour & Christou, 2026). The different positions of Oman, Qatar and European states show that the dispute was not only about the safety of ships or the amount of possible fees. More important was the question of whether Iran itself can set the conditions for passage through the strait, which is used by international shipping.

Regarding the economic consequences, during the first closure, as noted in the Beyond Hormuz report, at its peak more than 12 million barrels a day were taken off the market and traffic fell by over 90 per cent (George et al., 2026). Still, price increases have been limited by strategic reserves, bypass pipelines, China’s reserves, and the ability of markets to redirect supplies. However, these mechanisms primarily protected the oil market. There were no comparable reserves for natural gas, fertilizers, and some types of industrial raw materials.

In addition, the crisis has intensified competition between the world’s leading powers. The interests of the United States, China, Russia, the European Union, and the States of the region intersected in the Strait of Hormuz. The United States sought to preserve freedom of navigation and limit Iran’s capabilities. It was important for China to maintain stable energy supplies, and European states tried to protect international rules of passage while avoiding further escalation. Therefore, the events around the strait have affected not only the Middle East, but also the relations between the larger international players.

 Conclusion

 The crisis in the Strait of Hormuz goes far beyond the regional conflict and represents one of the most serious challenges to modern international security. Its consequences affect not only the States of the Middle East, but also the global economy, global energy markets, international trade and the system of international relations in general.

The crisis of 2026 just proved that the Hormuz’s importance is formed through the blend of its geographical location, size, and Iran’s possibility to deter other sides without even closing the full strait. One can also see the limits of military force just by looking at the US’s example that tried to return the previous level of passage. Thus, the measures should be taken with not just a mere focus on military protection of the route, but on reduction of the possibility of a new escalation. There should be constant communication channels between Iran, Oman, and the Gulf countries. Moreover, they should agree on clear rules of passage and joint mechanisms for reporting mines and attacks in a way that it will not result in misunderstanding as it was between the US and Iran; they should not interpret them in the opposite way this time. In the long term, exporters and importers should expand alternative pipelines. The crisis may also accelerate the transition to other energy sources. However, it is not yet possible to completely replace the Strait of Hormuz, since existing alternative routes are not capable of transporting the same amount of resources. Therefore, it is important to mitigate at least some of the economic consequences internationally.

In our opinion, the issue of blocking or opening the Strait of Hormuz for navigation lies primarily in the political and legal sphere. Its further settlement will depend on whether the parties, who see security issues in the region differently, can reach a compromise and take into account not only the immediate, but also the possible long-term consequences of their decisions. These differences also relate to a more general approach to regional security. Iran, for example, advocates a greater role for the states of the Middle East themselves and less dependence on the other regions. Therefore, a compromise should relate to the conditions of navigation, safety guarantees and the distribution of responsibility in the Strait. Such a decision may have implications for other strategically important sea straits, as changing existing rules may cause new disputes in other regions of the world. In addition, the situation around Hormuz is difficult to completely separate from other problems in Iranian-American relations. An agreement on the strait will not solve them by itself, but it can reduce tensions and facilitate further negotiations, including on Iran’s nuclear program.

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Introduction

The Second Termez Dialogue, held in Tashkent from 4–6 June 2026 under the theme “Peace, Connectivity, and Prosperity: Building a Shared Future,” reaffirmed the growing importance of connectivity between Central and South Asia as a fundamental driver of regional peace, economic development, and long-term stability. Connectivity is no longer understood solely in terms of physical infrastructure or trade networks. Instead, it has increasingly emerged as a broader political and diplomatic framework that facilitates regional cooperation, strengthens mutual trust, and promotes sustainable partnerships across Eurasia.¹

The expanding body of academic research on Central–South Asian relations over the past two decades reflects the changing dynamics of the international system. Growing economic interdependence, geopolitical realignments, and intensified cross-border interactions have reshaped the nature of regional cooperation. Contemporary international politics is increasingly characterised by interconnected regional spaces where political, economic, strategic, and socio-cultural interests overlap. As traditional geopolitical boundaries become less rigid, new forms of cooperation and competition are developing, creating opportunities for deeper regional integration while also generating complex security and governance challenges.²

Within this evolving international environment, Central and South Asia should be viewed as closely linked regional systems whose development is influenced not only by domestic political and economic conditions but also by broader global transformations. Shifting patterns of globalisation, competition over transport and trade corridors, energy security, and the reorganisation of international supply chains have reinforced the strategic significance of connectivity between the two regions. Consequently, strengthening interregional cooperation has become essential for advancing sustainable development, enhancing regional resilience, and promoting long-term stability across the wider Eurasian landscape.

Research Novelty and Author’s Thesis

The principal contribution of this study lies in reinterpreting connectivity between Central and South Asia as more than a matter of transport infrastructure or geo-economic cooperation. Instead, it conceptualizes connectivity as an evolving political and diplomatic framework that possesses its own institutional character and strategic relevance. In this context, interregional connectivity should not be viewed merely as an extension of externally driven geopolitical initiatives. Rather, it is increasingly emerging as a regionally owned strategy shaped by the collective efforts of Central and South Asian states through diplomatic engagement, institutional cooperation, and integrated transport networks. This evolution reflects a broader shift from perceiving connectivity as a physical infrastructure project to recognising it as a comprehensive strategy for promoting regional cooperation, resilience, and sustainable development.

Theoretical Foundations of Connectivity Research

Realistic Approach

The realist perspective provides an important foundation for understanding connectivity between Central and South Asia by highlighting the influence of power politics, national interests, and security concerns. According to realist theory, the international system is inherently anarchic, compelling states to prioritise survival, strategic autonomy, and the preservation of national interests.³ Within this framework, Central and South Asia constitute a strategically significant geopolitical space where interstate competition, security calculations, and the balance of power strongly influence regional interactions. Persistent challenges such as political instability, terrorism, cross-border extremism, and competition among external powers further reinforce the relevance of realism in explaining patterns of cooperation and conflict across the two regions.

Liberal Approach

In contrast, the liberal perspective emphasises the importance of cooperation, economic interdependence, and institutional engagement as the primary drivers of regional connectivity.⁴From this standpoint, expanding trade, improving transport infrastructure, encouraging investment flows, and strengthening multilateral institutions create opportunities for mutual benefit and long-term stability. Connectivity is therefore understood not only as an economic objective but also as a mechanism for enhancing trust, reducing transaction costs, and encouraging peaceful interaction among neighbouring states. Liberal theory suggests that deeper economic integration can generate shared interests that contribute to sustainable regional development.

Constructivist Approach

Constructivism offers a complementary interpretation by arguing that international relations are shaped not solely by material capabilities but also by ideas, identities, historical experiences, and social interactions.⁵The long-standing historical links between Central and South Asia, particularly those established through the Silk Road, have created enduring cultural connections and shared regional identities. These historical narratives continue to influence contemporary diplomacy by fostering mutual understanding and providing a normative basis for expanding cooperation. Consequently, connectivity is viewed not only as a material process but also as a socially constructed phenomenon rooted in shared historical and cultural experiences.

Regional Security Complex Theory

Another significant theoretical perspective is the Regional Security Complex Theory developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, which argues that neighbouring regions often function as interconnected security systems.⁶From this perspective, Central and South Asia are linked by a range of common security challenges, including terrorism, religious extremism, illicit drug trafficking, transnational organised crime, and irregular migration. Within this framework, Afghanistan occupies a pivotal position as a geographical and strategic bridge connecting the two regions. The country’s political stability therefore remains essential for strengthening regional connectivity and advancing broader security cooperation.

Macro-Regionalism and Emerging Geopolitical Configurations

Recent scholarship increasingly examines connectivity through the broader framework of macro-regionalism, recognising Central Asia as an integral part of larger geopolitical and geo-economic spaces, including Eurasia, the Indo-Pacific, East–West transport corridors, and North–South connectivity initiatives.⁷ This perspective broadens the significance of interregional cooperation by highlighting its role in promoting economic integration, strengthening strategic partnerships, and facilitating closer interaction across extensive transcontinental networks. As a result, connectivity has become an important component of emerging geopolitical configurations that extend beyond traditional regional boundaries.

Indian Perspective on Connectivity

Indian scholarship has also made significant contributions to the study of regional connectivity, particularly through the Connect Central Asia Policy, which seeks to deepen India’s engagement with Central Asia in the fields of trade, energy, transport, technology, and regional cooperation.⁸ This policy reflects India’s broader strategic objective of expanding its economic presence across Eurasia, improving access to regional markets and energy resources, and strengthening its geopolitical influence. At the same time, it provides a balanced approach to regional engagement by enhancing India’s strategic partnerships while responding to the growing influence of other major powers in the Eurasian region. Through this multidimensional strategy, connectivity is viewed not only as an instrument of economic development but also as a key element of India’s long-term regional and foreign policy objectives.

Political-Diplomatic Significance of the Termez Dialogue

Institutionalized diplomatic platforms play a vital role in strengthening cooperation and dialogue between Central and South Asia. Among these initiatives, the Termez Dialogue, introduced by Uzbekistan, has emerged as a significant mechanism for promoting interregional engagement.⁹ Its second meeting, held in June 2026, reinforced the platform’s growing importance amid evolving geopolitical and geo-economic dynamics. Historically, the city of Termez has served as a strategic centre for trade, cultural interaction, and civilizational exchange, linking the peoples of Central and South Asia for centuries.¹⁰ Building upon this historical legacy, the Termez Dialogue performs four important political and diplomatic functions. First, it provides a platform for experts and policymakers to discuss regional security challenges. Second, it supports Trans-Afghan connectivity, particularly by encouraging the development of the Uzbekistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan railway corridor.¹¹ Third, it promotes a new regional narrative by viewing Afghanistan as a partner in connectivity rather than solely as a source of instability. Finally, it contributes to the institutionalization of sustained interregional cooperation through regular dialogue and collaborative mechanisms. Consequently, the Termez Dialogue reflects a broader transformation from regional isolation towards constructive engagement and long-term partnership.

Geo-Economic Dimension of Connectivity

The geo-economic significance of connectivity is reflected in the expanding economic engagement between Central and South Asia, particularly at a time when global supply chains are undergoing significant transformation. As regional economies become increasingly interconnected, connectivity has emerged as a strategic instrument for promoting trade, investment, and sustainable economic growth. Major initiatives supporting this process include the Trans-Afghan transport corridors, improved access to Indian Ocean ports, the CASA-1000 electricity transmission project, the TAPI gas pipeline, and the development of multimodal logistics networks.¹² These initiatives not only facilitate the movement of goods, energy, and services but also enhance regional integration and economic resilience. In the contemporary geopolitical environment, transport infrastructure has evolved beyond its traditional economic function to become an important tool for strengthening strategic autonomy, expanding geopolitical influence, and improving regional competitiveness.

 Connectivity Diplomacy as a New Foreign Policy Paradigm

The growing emphasis on regional integration has contributed to the emergence of connectivity diplomacy as a new paradigm in foreign policy. This approach incorporates several complementary dimensions, including corridor diplomacy, infrastructure investment, supply-chain cooperation, and interregional dialogue platforms. Collectively, these instruments strengthen political trust while advancing economic integration and regional cooperation. For Uzbekistan, connectivity diplomacy has become an increasingly important component of its foreign policy strategy, reflecting its commitment to promoting regional stability, expanding cross-border partnerships, and positioning itself as a key facilitator of cooperation between Central and South Asia.¹³

Conclusion

This study highlights that connectivity between Central and South Asia extends well beyond the conventional understanding of transport infrastructure and trade networks. It should instead be viewed as a multidimensional political and strategic concept that incorporates geo-economic interests, geopolitical dynamics, institutional cooperation, civilizational linkages, and diplomatic engagement. Given its complexity, no single theory of International Relations is sufficient to explain the evolving nature of interregional connectivity. Rather, a comprehensive understanding requires integrating insights from realism, liberalism, constructivism, and regionalism, each of which captures different dimensions of the political, economic, and social processes shaping cooperation between the two regions.¹⁴

As noted in the Global Risks Report 2026, the international system is entering a period marked by strategic uncertainty, geopolitical fragmentation, and increasing competition over transport routes and connectivity corridors.¹⁵ In this changing environment, Central and South Asia are no longer peripheral regions but are emerging as important components of the broader Eurasian geopolitical and economic landscape. At the same time, regional connectivity is becoming increasingly driven by the initiatives and policy choices of the states within the region rather than by external major powers. In this evolving framework, Uzbekistan has assumed a proactive role by advancing diplomatic initiatives aimed at strengthening interregional cooperation.

Among these initiatives, the Termez Dialogue has emerged as one of the most significant institutional platforms for promoting political and diplomatic engagement.¹⁶ Its importance extends beyond expert consultations, as it is gradually developing into a sustainable mechanism for strengthening cooperation, fostering mutual trust, and enhancing coordination between Central and South Asia.

The long-term success of regional connectivity will depend on several interrelated factors, including sustained peace and stability in Afghanistan, continued investment in transport and logistics infrastructure, stronger institutional mechanisms, and closer policy coordination among regional governments. Ultimately, connectivity should be recognised not merely as an academic concept but as a strategic instrument capable of advancing peace, economic integration, and sustainable development across Eurasia. Supported by political commitment, effective diplomacy, and resilient institutions, it has the potential to shape a new paradigm of interregional cooperation in which connectivity serves as an independent driver of regional order and long-term prosperity rather than simply a consequence of globalisation.

References:

1. “The Termez Dialogue is Open to Diverse Views and does not Seek to Create Exclusive Blocs” — Eldor Aripov. https://isrs.uz/en/content/7/post/2097
2. Хелд Д., Макгрю Э. Глобальные трансформации: политика, экономика и культура. М.: Праксис, 2004. С. 67–104.
3. Theory of International Politics / Kenneth Waltz. Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979. P. 88–101.
4. After Hegemony / Robert Keohane. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. P. 7–16.
5. Social Theory of International Politics / Alexander Wendt. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. P. 1–20.
6. Regions and Powers / Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. P. 44–78.
7. Cannon B., Sim L.-C., Aminjonov F. Central Asia and the Indo-Pacific: bridging the divide in an age of great power rivalry// International Affairs, Volume 101, Issue 4, July 2025, Pages 1177–1191.
8. Understanding India Connect Central Asia Policy: A Study on India-Uzbekistan Relations. Journal of Asiatic Society for Social Science Research (JASSSR), August 31, 2021. Volume/Issue: Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 66–79.
9. Termez Dialogue 2025: Fostering Connectivity Between Central and South Asia. https://www.newscentralasia.net/2025/05/22/termez-dialogue-2025-fostering-connectivity-between-central-and-south-asia/
10. Бартольд В.В. Туркестан в эпоху монгольского нашествия. М.: Восточнаялитература, 2002. С. 45–92.
11. Asian Development Bank. CAREC Corridor Performance Measurement and Monitoring Annual Report. Manila: ADB, 2024. P. 87–103.
12. World Bank CASA-1000 Documentation. Washington, 2025. P. 12–48.
13. Лебедева М.М. Мироваяполитика. М.: Аспект Пресс, 2021. С. 198–233.
14. Dunne T., Kurki M., Smith S. International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity. Oxford: OUP, 2016. P. 95–126.
15. World Economic Forum. Global Risks Report 2026. Geneva, 2026. P. 5–31.

16.     Melvin N. Uzbekistan’s Regional Foreign Policy and the Reconfiguration of Central Asia // SIPRI Insights

Doctor of Political Science

Diplomatic Academy

University of World Economy and Diplomacy,

Republic of Uzbekistan

Tamilakhon Khaydarova

Undergraduate student

McGill University,

Canada

Key Words: Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia, Azerbaijan, ethnic conflict, territorial dispute, sovereignty, war, displacement, international security, international law.

Introduction

Nagorno-Karabakh, a region of south-western Azerbaijan, was not internationally recognized despite its self-declared independence from 1992 to 2023. It has, also, been the reason of intense ethno-political and territorial disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan (Britannica) for decades. Despite its seemingly localized nature, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict extends beyond the Caucasus region showing how vulnerable the global security system and international law are. The conflict has a profound impact on the international stage, as it raises fundamental issues such as the effectiveness of international law, the sustainability of the collective security system and the selective approaches of world powers to the principles of justice.

Historically, Nagorno-Karabakh was an autonomous oblast of Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (S.S.R.), which was mainly populated by the Armenian population. The region declared its independence under the name of the Republic of Artsakh after the Soviet Union was dismantled in the early 1990s, but its sovereignty was never recognized by the international community, including Armenia. The general territory, which includes the north-eastern flank of the Karabakh Range of the Lesser Caucasus and extends from the crest line of the range to the margin of the Kura River lowland at its foot, has a strategic importance and rich natural potential (Britannica). These features have created a unique conflict context and have only increased the political as well as ethnic complexity of the conflict.

Although the international community paid some attention to the conflict, it usually has been overshadowed by other global problems, like the war in Ukraine or the Israeli-Palestine conflict. After the 2020 armed operations, the crisis between Azerbaijan and Armenia started to be considered as almost over, with the parties negotiating a peace agreement. But ignoring the consequences, when humanitarian and legal issues remain unresolved, is dangerous and it undermines trust in international institutions that are supposed to ensure justice and stability for all.

All these historical, geographical, and demographic factors have turned the conflict into something more than just a territorial dispute. On the one hand, Azerbaijan defends the principle of territorial integrity, considering Karabakh as part of its recognized border. On the other hand, the Armenian population of the region has been trying to get the right to self-determination for decades, seeking national integrity or annexation to Armenia. There is also a conflict between state sovereignty – Azerbaijan’s right to control its territory – and humanitarian obligations to protect the rights and security of the population, especially during periods of hostilities.

All in all, the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia illustrates not only ethnopolitical and territorial disputes between the two states but also the weakness of the international system of law and security. This research paper examines the opposing positions of the parties, conflict’s historical evolution and its consequences for international law, regional stability, and international security. It will also show how the conflict undermines the legitimacy of existing institutions. This work will provide possible solutions to the conflict as well as reforms to international mechanisms for preventing and resolving similar crises in the future.

Historical Background

It is necessary to examine historical developments in detail to understand the current implications and challenges of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. From the beginning, Nagorno-Karabakh was officially an autonomous oblast within Azerbaijan S.S.R. Armenian population was not satisfied with the fact that the area in which it was predominant was not part of Armenia. As highlighted by Felix Light, Nagorno-Karabakh, known as Artsakh by Armenians, until 2023 had 100,000 inhabitants who were predominantly ethnic Armenians. For the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as for many in Armenia, this territory has always had an important historical and cultural meaning, while Azerbaijan considered it as an integral part of its territory. Despite the oblast’s predominantly Armenian population, the Soviet administration decided to include Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, granting it autonomy, which as a result became a trigger toward future opposition clashes.

In 1988, when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) began to weaken, Nagorno-Karabakh’s regional legislature passed a resolution declaring its intention to join the Republic of Armenia despite its official location within Azerbaijan (Center for Preventive Action). Armed fighting between the two Republics, which have a long history of ethnic tension, quickly followed (Center for Preventive Action). This led to the beginning of the first Karabakh War, which lasted from 1992 to 1994. The war claimed about 30,000 lives and led to massive population displacement (Galustyan). This only confirmed the fact that regional and international actors are unable to prevent violence. According to the Center for Preventive Action, the analytical unit within the United States based Council on Foreign Relations, by 1993, as a result of the armed actions; Armenia had gained control of Nagorno-Karabakh and occupied 20 percent of this territory. In the 1990s, the Azerbaijani population was itself expelled from Nagorno-Karabakh and hundreds of thousands of people were displaced within Azerbaijan.  A formal ceasefire was reached in 1993 with the help of Russia. This consolidated the de-facto independence of Karabakh under Armenian control. However, it did not receive international recognition, and all negotiations have reached an impasse. All this inability to move the problem beyond simple agreements has made the conflict chronic and protracted.

In late September 2020, heavy fighting broke out along the Azerbaijan -Nagorno-Karabakh border, killing more than seven thousand soldiers and civilians, with hundred more Armenian and Azerbaijani soldiers wounded (Center for Preventive Action). This fight was characterized as the second Karabakh War. This had demonstrated that the absence of an effective political settlement makes the resumption of violence only a matter of time.

Even though there were numerous ceasefires, the root causes of the conflict have raised concerns in the region due to unresolved issues. This showed that diplomatic stagnation could easily turn into a new escalation.

The blockade of the corridor has created difficult living conditions and increased pressure for the local population. It also showed how humanitarian access can be used as an instrument of political pressure. Ertl highlights that the Lachin Corridor is the only road that connects the Republic of Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh. It is a key artery for supplies, and residents in the territory reported severe shortages of basic food items and medication during the blockade (Ertl). This situation has left the population isolated, increasing their dependence on external factors.

Azerbaijan launched a decisive attack in September 2023, which ended with the surrender of the Armenian forces. The breakaway Republic and its institutions will “cease to exist” from 1 January 2024, the region’s separatist leader Samvel Shahramanyan has said (Ertl). About 100,000 Armenians were forced to leave the region.

As CIVICUS notes,

“When the end came, it came suddenly. […] A major Azerbaijan military offensive launched on 19 September quickly proved decisive. A ceasefire the following day confirmed Azerbaijan’s victory. On 28 September, Artsakh President Samvel Shahramanyan signed a decree dissolving all government institutions from 1 January 2024, bringing the unrecognized state’s 32-year existence to a close. By then, most of the population had already fled to Armenia.”

While the report emphasizes the abrupt end of the conflict, the mere fact of a mass exodus shows how vulnerable civilians have become in the absence of security guarantees.

Although international organizations, including the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), tried to mitigate the losses and help resolve the issue peacefully, they failed to achieve desired results. The long-term consequences of the conflict like militarization of the region, the growing distrust between people, undermining peacemaking efforts, and deepening of geopolitical divisions proved that the neglect of the early signs of tension by the international community and regional authorities can lead to a massive humanitarian catastrophe.

Consequences of the Conflict

The conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh has had an ongoing impact on the South Caucasus. It has affected not only borders, but also the humanitarian situation, the security structure and international relations. Despite the official termination of the unrecognized Republic of Artsakh in January 2024, the consequences of the conflict continue to be felt both in Azerbaijan and Armenia and beyond their borders.

The most tragic consequence of the conflict has been on the people themselves: the mass exodus seems to be the last and most heart-breaking episode in the endless story of the struggle and displacement, when hundreds of thousands of people were forced to leave their homes due to their different ethnic backgrounds (Alieva). People were leaving because of fear, the nine-month blockade, and the lack of basic security guarantees. As Lida Minasyan notes, “the nine-month blockade and the offensive were meant to achieve the ethnic cleansing of the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh” (CIVICUS). Displacement has led to the destruction of people’s holistic lives, social ties, and cultural identity. After being in these unstable conditions, people had to start all over again, without possessions, a sense of security, or mere confidence in the future.

However, the consequences of the conflict are not limited to a humanitarian crisis. They also manifest themselves in the systemic inefficiency of international institutions. Leila Alieva mentions that the Minsk group of the OSCE did not change but rather solidified the status quo between Armenia and Azerbaijan. International efforts not only did not contribute to the resolution of the conflict but also hindered the dynamics of change. It is known that for 30 years, no measures were taken by international organizations or governments to implement four resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) about the immediate withdrawal of Armenian troops from Karabakh (Alieva). This has shown that even binding decisions remain on paper if there is no pressure and clearer action to implement them. Ignoring the implementation of binding decisions gives the feeling that international norms can be ignored without consequences. Impunity undermines the credibility of legal instruments and makes them meaningless. It is in this context it becomes clear why the absence of progress in outside mediation has been crucial in spurring Azerbaijan’s military option (Alieva). When diplomacy is not working, opponents might resort to force as the only way to change the situation for the better side. After its military success, Azerbaijan strengthened its alliance with Turkey, confirming that the use of force can be more effective than participation in international negotiations. This weakens the positions of multilateral structures like the UN and OSCE. This dynamic can lead to instability and increased violence in solving problems in the future. When countries become disillusioned with the effectiveness of universal norms, the established way of life collapses, where there is no framework.

Despite its success in the conflict, Azerbaijan faces the outcome of the crisis as well. Aleksandre Kvakhadze writes: “the realization of the announced infrastructure projects and the complete restoration of the region’s infrastructure will require, besides the time, several billion dollars.”  In addition to finances, we need qualified personnel, coordination between central and local authorities, as well as stable institutional mechanisms.

The consequences of the conflict are not limited to the direct result of the fighting in the regions and require an integrated approach to address the problem in depth.

Possible Solutions

Although the self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh officially does not exist anymore, the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh cannot be considered over. Its consequences are still taking place. When solving the problem, it is worth paying attention not only to the post-war regional problems.

Firstly, it is important to update international mediation mechanisms, because the structure of the OSCE Minsk Group, for example, has shown its ineffectiveness. Moreover, as the report of the International Crisis Group highlights, more than twenty years of negotiations brokered by U.S., French, and Russian diplomats failed to yield meaningful progress, Azerbaijan launched a war to take back its territories by force. This shows that existing structures of peacemaking showed a lack of results, representing diplomacy as a meaningless process that couldn’t stop the escalation of the conflict. The renewal of the mechanisms should include clear, new formats of control of the stability. And the failure to meet the requirements of the structure would be penalized with sanctions or other things.

Nevertheless, efforts have been made in recent years to normalize relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan through the mediation of the European Union. The closest the sides came to compromise was under EU mediation (Vartanyan). Brussels proposed a model based on the post-2008 Georgia–Russia precedent, in which an independent foreign operator manages the logistics of routes through the disputed regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and shares data with all parties (Vartanyan). However, the EU-led negotiations stalled amid renewed border clashes and the 2023 crisis in Nagorno-Karabakh that ended its existence as an ethnic Armenian enclave (Vartanyan). This shows that even with a realistic and proven mediation model, the EU has not been able to prevent escalation of the conflict. This is because of the lack of diplomatic pressure and the inability to ensure monitoring on the ground. Also, there were no effective enforcement mechanisms, which also weakened the influence of the European Union as a mediator.

Secondly, the peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan remains unclear. In March 2024, the parties finalized the preparation of the text of the agreement, but its signing was blocked due to Azerbaijan’s demand to amend the Constitution of Armenia. According to the International Crisis Group’s report, “Azerbaijan reiterated the demand, which it had been making publicly for more than a year, that Armenia change its constitution before being bound by any agreement.” Baku believes that the preamble of Armenian’s constitution has references to illegal territorial claims. Armenia declares that the reform process was initiated internally and will be completed no earlier than 2026.  In that situation, the EU offers Armenia to sign a commitment to complete the reform (International Crisis Group). While the reform is in the process, there should be a mitigating side that would regularly report the situation to the security structures.

As of March 2025, after a series of negotiations, “”The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia confirmed the fact that the draft “Agreement on Peace and Establishment of Interstate Relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan”, has been agreed upon, as well as the agreement of this draft. Therefore, the peace agreement is ready to be signed. The Republic of Armenia is ready to start discussions with the Republic of Azerbaijan on the date and place of signing the agreement””, the Foreign Ministry said in a statement.

Thirdly, there is still an issue with the rights of displaced people. If Azerbaijan fails to secure property rights for them, then the Armenian side may find itself in a more favorable position in the international arena (Kvakhadze). To solve this problem, Azerbaijan must do its part so as not to lose its credibility in the international community. Compensation funds and support from international organizations for return and reintegration are needed to reduce discontent and tension.

It is also worth reducing any risk of escalation. The International Crisis Group states that Brussels should urge the two sides to commit to risk reduction measures, which could be especially important during the sensitive period before an agreement is signed. […] that would seek to reduce the military presence along the border and create mechanisms for defusing the risk that accidents and miscalculations could create an escalatory dynamic. This measure will be especially useful due to the uncertainty of signing the agreement and the expectation of reform on the part of Armenia.

Fourthly, Armenia must also make efforts to prevent the escalation of the conflict. It is important that the Armenian side officially recognizes the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, which will become the basis for a sustainable peace agreement. In addition, it is worth rejecting any statements suggesting territorial claims and supporting political and educational initiatives aimed at reconciliation. It is important to cooperate within the framework of international conflict prevention mechanisms. These may include measures to reduce the military presence along the border and create mechanisms to neutralize the risks associated with incidents and miscalculations that could provoke escalation. These steps are especially relevant in the context of the uncertainty surrounding the signing of the agreement and the expectation of reforms on the part of Armenia. At the same time, the recent steps of the parties inspire some hope for finding a mutually acceptable solution. As it became known to Middle East Eye, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev plan to meet in Dubai later this month, as the two countries continue negotiations on a peace agreement.

Without steps towards a deep solution to the problem, regions and international security will continue to be vulnerable to new outbreaks of conflict and violence.

Conclusion

Overall, the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh turned out not just as a regional territorial problem, but as a serious interstate conflict, showing the weakness of the existing system of international law, the security system and the low effectiveness of international institutions created to resolve such conflicts. By ignoring early signs of escalation, the international community showed its inability to overcome even “small” conflicts. Therefore, it is clear that in order to fully mitigate the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and overcome its consequences, the system of international organizations needs reform to increase the effectiveness of their decisions in similar conflicts.

Notes and References

1. Alieva, Leila. “Nagorny Karabakh: The Consequences of International Inaction.” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 3 Oct. 2023, iwpr.net/global-voices/nagorny-karabakh-consequences-international-inaction.
2. “Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict.” President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev, president.az/en/pages/view/azerbaijan/karabakh. Accessed 22 June 2025.
3. Center for Preventative Action. “Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict .” Council on Foreign Relations, 20 Mar. 2025, www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/nagorno-karabakh-conflict.
4. “Nagorno-Karabakh: Far-Reaching Consequences of a Neglected Conflict.” CIVICUS LENS, 10 Nov. 2023, lens.civicus.org/nagorno-karabakh-far-reaching-consequences-of-a-neglected-conflict/.
5. Ertl, Michael. “Nagorno-Karabakh: Conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenians Explained.” BBC News, 28 Sept. 2023, www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-66852070.
6. Galustyan, Artem. “War and Myth: What Is Happening in Nagorno-Karabakh.” Forbes, 13 Apr. 2016, www.forbes.ru/novosti/obshchestvo/317775-voina-i-mif-chto-proiskhodit-v-nagornom-karabakhe.
7. International Crisis Group. “Armenia and Azerbaijan: Getting the Peace Agreement across the Finish Line.” International Crisis Group, 22 May 2025, www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/armenian-azerbaijani-conflict/armenia-and-azerbaijan-getting-peace-agreement-across-finish-line.
8. Kvakhadze, Aleksandre. “After the Karabakh War: Key Issues of Politics and Security.” Rondeli Foundation, 23 June 2021, gfsis.org.ge/publications/view/2994.
9. Light, Felix. “What Is the History of the Conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan? .” Reuters, 13 Mar. 2025, www.reuters.com/world/what-is-history-conflict-between-armenia-azerbaijan-2025-03-13/.
10. “MFA Statement.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, 13 Mar. 2025, www.mfa.am/en/interviews-articles-and-comments/2025/03/13/mfa_statement/13114.
11. “Nagorno-Karabakh.” Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, inc., 15 June 2025, www.britannica.com/place/Nagorno-Karabakh.
12. Schmitt, Michael, and Kevin Coble. “The Evolving Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict – an International Law Perspective – Part II.” Lieber Institute West Point, 29 Sept. 2023, lieber.westpoint.edu/evolving-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-international-law-perspective-part-ii/.
13. Soylu, Ragip. “Azerbaijani and Armenian Leaders to Meet in Dubai Later in July.” Middle East Eye, 2 July 2025, www.middleeasteye.net/news/azerbaijan-aliyev-and-armenia-pashinyan-meet-dubai.
14. “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: A Visual Explainer .” International Crisis Group, www.crisisgroup.org/content/nagorno-karabakh-conflict-visual-explainer. Accessed 22 June 2025.
15. “Two More Conditions. Why Armenia and Azerbaijan Have Not yet Signed a Peace Treaty?” BBC News Russian Service, www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c2lzjw9gn0wo. Accessed 22 June 2025.
16. Vartanyan, Olesya. “Why Armenia Is Seeking to Normalize Relations with Turkiye.” Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, 1 July 2025, carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/06/armenia-turkiye-rapprochement?lang=en.

The author of this article has been directly and professionally involved with the issue of diplomatic terminology since the early years of Uzbekistan’s independence. During the formation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan, efforts began to implement the Law on the State Language across all ministries and departments. One significant initiative was the introduction of the Uzbek language into the Ministry’s operations. In the initial stages, the author, as a member of the Secretariat, was responsible for preparing Uzbek summaries of documents and correspondence received from around the world, which were then presented to the leadership. This work marked the beginning of dealing with diplomatic terminology.

Soon, the need arose to draft agreements, treaties, and other political documents in Uzbek. However, since such documents were typically prepared in Russian or English, the development of relevant terminology in Uzbek had not been addressed and remained an unexplored area of study.

A six-member working group was established to address this gap and support the implementation of the language law. Their task was to translate into Uzbek the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations, foundational texts in global diplomacy. These conventions encompass nearly all key diplomatic terms. Each group member received a section to translate. The most experienced members, A. Buribekov and the author, who both had backgrounds in translation and publishing, took the lead in editing and harmonising the translations. It was later felt that re-translating rather than editing the portions done by the other members would have been more efficient. Ultimately, the translation was completed primarily by these two individuals. The resulting translations and coined terms became foundational in the initial international treaties and agreements signed by Uzbekistan.

This, however, was just the beginning. The translation of the conventions and the creation of corresponding terminology did not imply that two individuals had single-handedly developed an entire system of diplomatic language. The research and standardisation of this field continued in the years that followed. Professionals understand the complexities of finding appropriate equivalents for terms and concepts that have no direct parallel in the target language. Some terms are easy to identify, while others require prolonged deliberation. Nonetheless, the timely completion of this work greatly benefited various departments within the Ministry, diplomats, and the authors themselves.

A. Buribekov continued to utilise this expertise in editing all official documents within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while the author, as head of the editorial department of the Ministry’s Zhakhon news agency, relied heavily on it for preparing and translating political articles published in government newspapers. The author encountered similar challenges later while working at the Institute for Strategic and Interregional Studies under the President of Uzbekistan. At that time, R. Khakimov, a senior colleague at the institute, proposed translating the United Nations Charter into Uzbek. Leveraging years of experience, the author successfully completed the translation, which was published in thousands of copies by the Tashkent office of the United Nations. The author was recognised with a certificate from the UN Special Representative for officially translating the Charter into Uzbek.

The author spent nearly fifteen years as head of the international departments at two universities after serving in these political and diplomatic roles, continuing to confront challenges related to political and diplomatic language and correspondence.

These experiences form the foundation of the author’s motivation for creating a specialised dictionary of diplomatic terms. The publication of the Azerbaijani-language “Diplomatic Encyclopedic Dictionary” further inspired him. This inspiration was not only professional but also personal, driven by a deep sense of responsibility and the availability of favourable conditions for scholarly work.

Any meaningful project begins with a review of existing work to avoid redundancy. The author first consulted Professor G. Dadabaev, a linguist, to inquire whether any research had already been conducted in this field. Professor Dadabaev confirmed that no comprehensive studies had been done on political and diplomatic terminology in Uzbek.

Author approached the University of World Economy and Diplomacy in Uzbekistan for more clarity on the subject. With their full support and guidance, he gained access to preliminary research and resources. The next step was to liaise with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for access to archival materials and support. It is worth noting that the Senate of the Oliy Majlis of Uzbekistan had recently instructed the Ministry to develop diplomatic terminology for high-level international documentation. In response, the Ministry established a Translation Centre, which later collaborated with the author on this endeavour.

A dictionary, in general, is understood as a reference work that offers meanings and translations of words. An explanatory dictionary, more specifically, provides in-depth definitions and explanations. The author aimed to produce such a dictionary in the diplomatic field, collecting terms, phrases, and definitions within international relations and presenting them in an accessible format.

The core of this effort was based on the authoritative three-volume “Diplomatic Dictionary” edited by A.A. Gromyko and published in the 1970s by Politizdat in Moscow. This dictionary, widely recognised for its scholarly merit, covers concepts in modern international relations, foreign policy, diplomatic history, conferences, treaties, and prominent diplomats. Alongside this Russian resource, the author consulted respected English-language dictionaries.

Author prioritised the most frequently used terms for initial translation given the enormity of translating entire dictionaries. These were reviewed by both linguistic and diplomatic experts, and then released for public use before proceeding to the next set.

Surprisingly, other comprehensive Uzbek-language sources—such as the “Russian International Dictionary of Words” (1972), the five-volume “Russian-Uzbek Dictionary,” the two-volume “Explanatory Dictionary of the Uzbek Language,” and the Uzbek Encyclopedic—contained little to no diplomatic terminology.

The dictionary was enriched based on the established cooperation with the Diplomatic Academy’s partner, the India-Central Asia Foundation, the MERI Group of Institutes. During the work on the dictionary, different sources on this topic published in India were also used. One of the results of this collaboration was the monograph “Cooperation and Interdependence of Central and South Asia”, jointly prepared and published by scholars from both countries.

On the subject of translation, it is important to consider the origin and adaptation of terms. Many diplomatic terms in Russian and other languages are borrowed directly from Latin, French, or English. While using international terms is sometimes practical, it is equally important to develop native equivalents that preserve linguistic purity. However, such an effort requires collective work from language commissions, academic institutions, and experts.

For instance, let us consider how to render common Russian diplomatic terms like “substitution,” “country of preference,” or “seniority” into Uzbek. This reflection underscores the necessity of structured, collaborative work in developing an accurate and comprehensive diplomatic vocabulary.

The increasing reliance on internet-based translation tools has also led to issues. These tools often provide only one literal translation without contextual usage or multiple meanings. They may result in “calque” translations—direct, unidiomatic renderings that lack nuance. In contrast, comprehensive dictionaries provide extensive definitions, examples, and alternative meanings, making them far superior for professional translation.

The creation of an “Explanatory Dictionary of Diplomatic Terms” in Uzbek represents a crucial step toward eliminating inconsistencies in political and diplomatic language. Without a standardised reference, there is no guarantee that terms used in various conferences, diplomatic correspondence, treaties, and official documents will remain consistent. In today’s interconnected world, the development of diplomatic terminology must evolve alongside the nation’s foreign policy and international engagement.

This endeavour is both a national priority and a professional duty for linguists, translators, and diplomats in Uzbekistan. The author emphasises that the successful development of a modern diplomatic lexicon in Uzbek will not only promote linguistic self-reliance but also ensure the accuracy, clarity, and credibility of the country’s voice in the global arena.