Tamilakhon Khaydarova
High school student of “Profi School”
Tashkent, Uzbekistan
tamilakhon@gmail.com

Abstract.

The article critically analyses historical, political, cultural as well as social aspects that have played a crucial role in shaping the status of women in Afghanistan. It examines the systematic oppression and violence faced under different regimes and highlights the resilience and activism that women have embodied against adversity. The study explores women’s struggles aiming to challenge societal norms and combat injustice in various areas such as education, political participation, employment, and access to healthcare. It also illustrates the vitality of Afghan women’s empowerment and full participation in all aspects of society. The paper concludes with the potential for further progress, emphasizing that continued efforts are the key factor in overcoming adversity. It also demonstrates the strong correlation between social progress and stability and the promotion of women’s rights in Afghanistan, which together create a better future for all.

Key words.Afghanistan, gender-based violence, women’s rights, equality, gender-focused institutions,status of women, access to education.

Introduction

An overview

Afghanistan is a landlocked multiethnic country located in between Central and South Asia. Lying along important trade routes connecting southern and eastern Asia to Europe and the Middle East. Afghanistan has long been a prize sought by empire builders, and for millennia great armies have attempted to subdue it, leaving traces of their efforts in great monuments now fallen to ruin.[1]

Afghanistan is also known for its rich heritage and tumultuous history, offering a solid ground when it comes to the situation of women. Over the years, Afghan women have faced numerous challenges, yet their resilience and determination have become symbols of hope and progress for brighter future.

Historical Context                                                                                                                                   

The role of women in Afghan society before conflict and political instability

The history of women’s rights and their role in Afghan society paints a complex and diverse picture. Before the conflict and political instability that Afghanistan experienced, women played a significant role in various spheres of society. Women fulfilled roles as teachers, government workers, medical doctors, lawyers, judges, journalists, writers and poets up until the early 1990s. Moreover, women had constituted 40% of the doctors in Kabul; 70% of school teachers; 60% of Kabul University professors and 50% of the University students.[2] It was not unusual for men and women to casually mingle at movie theatres and on university campuses. This is a far cry from little girls heading to schools today fearing an acid attack.[3]  While Afghan society was largely patriarchal, with males holding positions of authority and power, women’s roles were not insignificant.

In Afghan society, domestic duties, such as managing the household and raising children were primarily responsibilities of women. They were expected to adhere to strict cultural as well as religious norms, including wearing the hijab or burqa. However, women also played important economic roles, specifically in rural areas, where they engaged in agriculture and livestock rearing. Afghan women were also prominent in the arts, where they held roles as poets, writers, and musicians.

The impact of War and Conservatism on Women’s Rights

The impact of war and conservatism on Afghan women’s rights has been dramatic and devastating. In the late 1970s, Afghanistan witnessed the Soviet invasion, which led to prolonged conflict and instability. Meanwhile, conservative ideas gained traction, which significantly affected women’s rights, including their social and political participation.

Under the Taliban regime, which ruled large parts of the country from 1996 to 2001, women faced extreme oppression and gender-based violence. The Taliban imposed a strict interpretation of sharia law and Pashtun code of conduct Pashtunwali, which severely limited women’s freedoms and rights. Women were effectively banned from education, health care, and employment, and their visibility was effectively erased from public life.

Key Milestones in the fight for Women’s Equality

Despite the challenges, Afghan women have shown great courage and strength in the struggle for equality. A pivotal moment came with the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, following a U.S.-led intervention. This move paved the way for the gradual restoration of women’s rights and participation in society. Afghan women regained their right to education, employment and political participation. A new Afghan constitution adopted in 2004 established equal rights for women, allowing them to participate in politics, society and the economy.

Article 22 states “Any kind of discrimination and distinction between citizens of Afghanistan shall be forbidden. The citizens of Afghanistan, man and woman, have equal rights and duties before the law.” [4]

Another significant development was the establishment of the Women’s Office in 2001. This office was transformed into the Ministry of Women’s Affairs of Afghanistan and abolished in 2021 after the Taliban take over. This government agency has played a pivotal role in advocating for women’s rights and combating gender-based discrimination. Nevertheless, the role of women in Afghan society before the conflict and political instability was multifaceted. Traditional gender roles had prevailed, but many Afghan women were actively involved in different parts of the society. However, the impact of war and extremism has severely undermined women’s rights. Despite these challenges, Afghan women have made great strides in the fight for equality, driven by such milestones as the establishment of basic gender-focused Institutions and laws marked by important milestones such as the establishment of key gender-focused Institutions and legislation. The ongoing struggle for women’s rights remains a vital aspect of Afghanistan’s journey toward a more equitable and inclusive society.

Problems faced by Afghan women in everyday life

Afghan women have endured a lot of challenges throughout their history and have faced systemic discrimination and oppression. Their struggles were deeply rooted in cultural norms and exacerbated by periods of conflict and political turmoil.

For example, today, Afghanistan’s women and girls are required to adhere to a strict dress code and are not permitted to leave their homes without a mahram (accompanying male relative). They are compelled to stay at home. All over the country, women report feeling invisible, isolated, suffocated, living in prison likes conditions.[5]

In recent years, however, there has been a growing recognition of the significance of women’s empowerment in Afghanistan, as it is important for the country’s progress and development in numerous aspects.

Historically, Afghan women have faced immense hurdles in their quest for basic rights and freedoms. Traditional gender roles have dictated a subordinate position for women in society, with limited access to education, healthcare, and employment opportunities. They have been subjected to strict social and cultural restrictions, often denied the right to make decisions about their own lives. Under the Taliban regime, these limitations worsened significantly, with women virtually disappearing from public life.

Through grassroots movements and campaigns, they have been striving to assert their rights and challenge gender inequality. “Bread, Work, Freedom” one of the most frequently used and popular slogans during the grassroots protests led by women. The demands were remarkably simple yet crucial. Women were defending what they knew the Taliban would attack: their independence, agency, mobility, and freedom. These women were asserting their rights to social and financial independence. They were also demanding dignity and risking their lives for a better future for all Afghan people.[6]

The Significance of Women’s Empowerment in the country

It is a proven fact that a country cannot develop and become prosperous unless women are given their due space. Any country which denies women their due space would continue to remain in poverty and conflict. Women contributions make decisive contributions in the development journey of a country. Scholars see a link between increased women’s empowerment and positive outcomes for society as a whole.[7] Empowering Afghan women is critical to the future stability and development of the country. Ensuring women’s equal participation in all spheres of society is important for democracy as well as the economy. Empowering women enables Afghanistan to tap into a vast pool of talent, skill and creativity that has long been overlooked.

Furthermore, the empowerment is pivotal for sustainable development, peace and security. Women are essential agents for positive social change and their voices and perspectives must be included in all efforts to rebuild the nation. They definitely have unique insights into problems related to health, education, and community development making their involvement in decision-making processes absolutely indispensable.

Education plays a pivotal role in empowering women. Historically, the female literacy rate in Afghanistan has been extremely low. However, efforts have been made to increase female enrollment and improve the quality of education. Education provides women with knowledge and skills enabling them to become economically independent, make informed decisions and actively participate in the active live of their communities.

Employment opportunities are also crucial for women’s empowerment. These opportunities not only provide financial stability but also empower women to challenge traditional gender roles and contribute to the economic growth of their families and communities.

Political participation is another significant aspect of women’s empowerment. Afghan women have been increasingly participating in political processes, both at the grassroots and national levels. Their inclusion in decision-making processes ensures their voices are heard and their perspectives are considered in shaping policies and laws that affect them directly.

Access to healthcare is essential for women’s well-being and empowerment. Afghanistan has made significant progress in improving maternal health, reducing child mortality rates, and combating diseases. The empowerment of women in this aspect involves ensuring their access to quality healthcare services, reproductive rights, and gender-responsive healthcare policies.

Although noticeable progress has been made, dramatic hurdles in achieving women’s empowerment in Afghanistan are still concerning. Cultural norms, violence against women, and limited access to resources continue to hinder progress. Continuous efforts are needed to tackle these issues and create an environment where women can live without fierce of future and where they are empowered and their rights are protected.

Current Situation

Status of Women’s Rights in modern-day Afghanistan

The status of women’s rights in modern-day Afghanistan is a topic of great importance and concern. Since the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, there has been most comprehensive, systematic, and unparalleled assault on the rights of women and girls. According to United Nations Women Executive Director, Sima Bahous, more than 50 orders and restrictions have been issued by Taliban leaving no aspect of women’s lives untouched, no freedom spared. They have created a system founded on the mass oppression of women that is rightly and widely considered gender apartheid.[8] Many are unable to have their basic needs met without access to employment or aid, including access to medical healthcare and psychological support in particular for victims of violence, including sexual violence. It’s a sobering reminder of how swiftly and aggressively women’s and girls’ rights can be taken away.[9] Despite efforts made by the international community and local activists, women in Afghanistan still face significant challenges and obstacles that hinder their ability to enjoy their rights fully.

The Impact of Cultural, Social, and Political Factors

Cultural factors play a vital role in the status of women in Afghan society. Afghanistan has a deeply rooted patriarchal culture, where gender roles are rigidly defined and the authority and decision-making power are given to men. Practices such as child marriage, honor killings, and the denial of education to girls are common and lay in culture more penetrating values that promote persistent gender inequality. These practices restrict women’s freedom and limit their potential for both personal and professional development.

Social factors also contribute to the challenges Afghan women face every day. The prevailing conservative views in Afghan society regarding women’s roles and behaviors further restrict their rights and freedoms. For instance, women in almost all cases face severe restrictions on their mobility and interactions with unrelated males. These social norms reinforce the idea that a woman’s primary role is various household chores, limiting their education, employment and participation in civic life.

The political landscape in Afghanistan has also shaped the status of women’s rights. Decades of conflict and instability have adversely affected gender equality efforts. Particularly from 1996 to 2001, the Taliban regime severely restricted women’s rights, confined women to their homes and denied access to education and employment.

Despite these challenges, Afghan women have made remarkable strides in recent years. The adoption of the Constitution of Afghanistan in 2004 and subsequent legal reforms have provided some protection for women’s rights. The establishment of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and greater representation of women in political decision-making positions have also been positive steps but there remains a huge gap between legislation and implementation, leaving many women vulnerable to discrimination, violence and social inequality they are set aside.

Address the Challenges and Obstacles Women continue to face

It is important to focus on short-term and long-term strategies to address the challenges and obstacles that Afghan women continue to face. Short-term interventions can include safe spaces, support services, and legal assistance for survivors of gender-based violence. Investment in education and skills training programs can empower women economically and increase their social and political participation. Long-term strategies should aim to change cultural norms and attitudes towards gender equality through awareness campaigns, community engagement and legislation jointly advocate for reforms Work together at the domestic and international levels to build a just and inclusive society that respects and protects women’s rights.

Women’s Empowerment Initiatives:

Given the historically unequal status of women in Afghanistan, women’s empowerment has become an important and ongoing issue in Afghanistan. Various organizations and individuals have made significant efforts to promote women’s empowerment through initiatives, campaigns, and projects. These endeavors aim to improve women’s access to education, employment opportunities and participation in the decision-making process.

One notable organization working towards women’s empowerment in Afghanistan is the Afghan Women’s Network (AWN). The AWN was established with the active support of the women’s movement in different part of the world in 1995.

Afghan Women’s Network is the foundation for Afghan women’s movement in the country.[10] AWN has played an important role in advocating for women’s rights and supporting their social, political and economic participation. AWN has implemented a number of successful initiatives and campaigns focusing on raising awareness of women’s rights, skills training and promoting women’s leadership roles.

Another notable initiative is the Afghan Girls’ Robotics Team, which gained international recognition and acclaim. Comprised of young Afghan girls, who had a passion for Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM), this team has defied societal expectations and challenges to showcase their talents on a global stage. Their participation and success in international robotics competitions have challenged gender stereotypes and inspired many young Afghan women to pursue a career in different STEM fields.

Impact of Education, Employment, and Participation in Decision-making Processes

Education has proven to be an important tool for women’s empowerment in Afghanistan. In recent years, great strides have been made in girls’ access to education. Establishing and supporting girls’ schools, scholarships and education programs to increase female enrollment and improve female literacy Education not only equips women with knowledge and skills but enables them to contribute to the socio-economic development of their communities.

Employment opportunities have also played a key role in women’s empowerment in Afghanistan. The establishment of microfinance programs, vocational training centers, and enterprise development initiatives has provided women with opportunities for economic self-reliant. Through these initiatives, women gain financial independence, improved their living standards, and challenge traditional gender norms and roles. Furthermore, employment of women in various sectors contribute to the overall economic growth of the country.

The participation of women in decision-making processes is another crucial aspect of their empowerment. Efforts have been made to increase the representation of women in politics, governance, and community leadership roles, which is a positive development for overall conditions as well as basic equality in the country.

Conclusions

The promotion of women’s rights has been a key driver of social progress in countries around the world. Afghanistan, a country with a long history of patriarchal values ​​and gender inequality, has struggled to empower women and ensure their rights are protected.  Afghanistan has experienced significant upheaval and social transformation in recent decades. The country’s turbulent history, including conflicts and political instability, has had a profound impact on the status of women. Prior to the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, women in Afghanistan faced severe oppression, with limited access to education, employment, healthcare, and political participation. Much progress has been made since then. The Afghan Constitution, adopted in 2004, establishes the principle of gender equality and prohibits discrimination against women.

In 2023, Afghanistan remains the only country where teenage girls and women do not have access to education, employment, and freedom of movement. Despite the severe economic costs of maintaining these restrictions – not only for women and girls but for the entire population – the Taliban have been persistent in maintaining these bans.

The Taliban’ restrictions on women’s rights are compounding the humanitarian disaster in Afghanistan that was prompted by the sharp cut-off of most foreign aid after the Taliban takeover in August 2021. Taliban regulations prevent women from working for humanitarian organizations, thus making it more difficult for women and children to get aid and secure livelihoods.[11]

Potential for Further Advancements       

Afghanistan continues to face social, cultural, and economic barriers that hinder the full realization of women’s rights. Traditional gender norms and discriminatory attitudes persist in many communities, limiting opportunities for women and exacerbating gender-based violence. Continued efforts at various levels are needed to overcome these challenges and further advance women’s rights. Addressing gender inequality requires a comprehensive set of measures covering education, economic empowerment, health care and the legal system. It is important to provide quality education to girls and ensure equal opportunities for their development. Economic empowerment programs that enable women to participate fully in the workforce and decision-making processes are also needed.

Importance of continued support for women’s rights in Afghanistan

Promoting and protecting women’s rights in Afghanistan is not only a matter of justice but also critical to overall social progress and stability. Several studies have shown positive correlations between gender equality and economic growth, social cohesion, and sustainable peace. With access to education and equal opportunities, women can contribute to the workforce, inspire innovation, and contribute to the overall well-being of their families and communities. Empowering women also creates an inclusive society, where ideas and talents are valued and utilized. Supporting women’s rights in Afghanistan continues to be a priority for the international community. Adequate funding and resources are essential in the implementation of laws and policies that promote gender equality. In addition, awareness campaigns and education programs should be used to challenge harmful gender stereotypes and promote a culture of respect and equality.

References

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[1]https://www.britannica.com/place/Afghanistan

[2]https://tolonews.com/opinion/history-women-afghanistan-then-and-now

[3]https://tolonews.com/opinion/history-women-afghanistan-then-and-now

[4]https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Afghanistan_2004

[5]https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/03/afghanistan-un-experts-say-20-years-progress-women-and-girls-rights-erased

[6]https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/08/16/bread-work-freedom-afghan-womens-two-years-resistance

[7]http://yris.yira.org/essays/4883

[8]https://www.unwomen.org/en/news-stories/statement/2023/08/statement-on-afghanistan-by-un-women-executive-director-sima-bahous

[9]https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/03/afghanistan-un-experts-say-20-years-progress-women-and-girls-rights-erased

[10]https://awn-af.org/about/

[11]https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/03/09/8-march-2023-what-are-main-challenges-women-and-girls-rights-afghanistan

 Report on the International seminar on
“India’s Geopolitical and Logistical Outreach to Central Asia “,
21-22 April 2022

The two day international seminar on “India’s Geopolitical and Logistical Outreach to Central Asia” evoked a lot of interest and was highly stimulating. The seminar threw up new ideas for discussion, thereby adding to our understanding of the region. The audience retained their interest till the end.

In order to understand the present day Central Asia, it is necessary to examine the geopolitical region in which they are located. Today two important issues impinge on its stability and security. The prevailing uncertainty in Afghanistan was hotly debated. On this issue two divergent view-points were put forward. One view as put forward by the Central Asian States (CAS ) that it was necessary to interact with the Taliban without recognising the regime, was necessary. Tajikistan did not concur with this view and do not engage with the Taliban in any way. However, it was stressed that development activity was necessary, lest an isolated Afghanistan becomes a rogue state on their borders. Hence engagement with the Taliban at least for developmental purposes should be under taken. One view believably, pointed out that the Taliban had changed. The second argument stated that India should not engage with the Taliban, as it does not enjoy legitimacy. Or international recognition. Today Afghanistan stands isolated in the international system. Moreover what kind of development initiative can be undertaken? What can roads and rail network accomplish with a moribund economy.

The second issue that impinges on Central Asian stability and security is the uncontrolled drug trafficking, smuggling of arms, etc. The recent violent border clashes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, were reportedly incited by the drug mafia. The mafia was averse to the border agreement between the two countries, as it would have hampered the smooth transfer of the contraband from Afghanistan. Though the Taliban has banned the cultivation of poppy its decree is ineffective as there are no enforcement agencies who could enforce it. On the other hand the drug cartels and organised crime personnel are rampant and active. The drug mafia oversees the passage of drugs; from the field to the border.

Besides, how will the Russian military intervention in Ukraine impact on Central Asia. The CAS are likely to come under intense pressure for pursuing certain policies. The recent protests in Kazakhstan were, reportedly engineered by Russia. An observation by a Russian journalist is apt “We do not want a second Ukraine”. However, it is also likely that India Russia ties will come under pressure. Would it affect Indian attempts to increase its engagement with the CAS, its strategic neighbourhood? It is important for India, as in September 2022 India will take over the Chairmanship of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Probably Indian efforts in Central Asia could be stymied.

Coming to the central focus of the seminar; connectivity and transport corridors various options were put forward. Prominent among these was the Iranian port of Chabahar; a multi modal corridor a combination of sea, surface transport and rail link that reaches Uzbekistan via Afghanistan. The second option was the Trans Afghan Corridor, a single mode corridor by surface transport (Karachi- Peshawar- Afghanistan-Uzbekistan) The Uzbek participants and Mr. Arash Younoshi President of Balkh, Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Afghanistan, forcefully argued in favour of the Trans Afghan Corridor. Another option used by India is via the Jebel Ali port in Dubai to reach Central Asia. From the perspective of single mode corridor a brief mention was made via the Attari/ Wagah border to for transportation via Pakistan- Afghanistan and Uzbekistan.

In the ensuing discussion it was pointed out Chabahar is still ‘work in progress’ and a rail link from Zahedan to Sarrakhs (Turkmenistan ) needs to be urgently constructed, as the passage through Afghanistan has to be avoided in view of the prevailing uncertain security situation. The Trans Afghan Corridor may not find favour with Indian transporters and traders given the troubled India Pakistan relations. The consensus was in favour of Chabahar for India.

The Chabahar route is India’s preferred option. Apart from troubled relations with Pakistan, the Trans Afghan Corridor passes through treacherous territory. It’s easier to deal with problems, difficulties relating to Chabahar in consultation with the Iranian government. In-fact, the advantages that accrue from Chabahar far outweigh the disadvantages. Coming to the advantages that accrue to India, is that cargo /containers, though delayed, reaches the destination. The participants from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan appreciated India’s vaccine diplomacy and the support rendered by it. Mr Khashinov, Director-Minister for Investment and Foreign Trade, Tashkent, pointed out the main direction of India Uzbekistan Cooperation. He suggested construction of medical centres, the production of building materials, the development of information and communication technologies, energy, chemical technologies, light industry etc. Professor Laura Yerekesheva of Al Farabi National University, Almaty also mentioned cooperation in Information Technology, agriculture and biotechnology. Professor Zamira Muratalieva of Russian Kyrgyz Slavic University mentioned defence cooperation. An important area for cooperation, Kyrgyzstan is extremely rich in minerals and this area for cooperation needs to be explored. A Preferential Trade Agreement between India and the CAS would go a long way in enhancing economic activities and cooperation.

While areas of cooperation hold immense promise there are problems and issues connected with the smooth functioning of the Chabahar route that should be resolved through dialogue. Among the issues mentioned was the failure of Indian exporters to obtain a Bank Realization Certificate Without the certificate exporters cannot claim their dues. This is because all the Indian Banks’ Nostro accounts are in the U S. Other disadvantages flagged were lack of awareness among traders and exporters, and freight forwarding agencies, shortage of manpower, currency conversion, devaluation, etc. In order to address the challenges a valuable suggestion was made “to hold a joint forum with the participation of representatives of transport structures of India, Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries in order to develop a general line and a unified strategy”. This would create better awareness among the traders and exporters, and facilitate the smooth functioning of the Chabahar transport corridor.

At the regional level; the threats to Central Asian security emanate from transnational characters and their nefarious activities, are carried out by non-state actors. This poses a grave danger to sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states. These insidious forces are entrenched in Afghanistan, and have acquired the ability to use modern weapons and technology. “The Central Asian states are facing new forms of terrorism such as terror financing, arms and drug trafficking, dissemination of a radical ideology and abuse of cyber space to spread disinformation and incite violence “Mr. Habibullo, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of the Republic of Tajikistan”. Another issue confronting the CAS is their serious differences over the sharing of water of the two life giving rivers; Amu Darya and Syr Darya. Since the CAS are agrarian based economies water is essential. So far they have adopted a bilateral approach to this issue. It’s necessary to approach the water issue from a multidimensional perspective. An equally difficult issue is the border disputes among the countries. This is acute in the Fergana valley straddling Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. All the three issues mentioned are grave and should be addressed by the CAS themselves.

The next presentation highlighted on the need to further expand India Uzbekistan relations. The Delhi Declaration of January 2022 amply demonstrated the urgent need for connectivity and transport corridors to link up with landlocked Central Asia. The Delhi Declaration was the outcome of a virtual meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the five Presidents of CAS.

SEMINAR PARTICIPANTS :

• Professor A Khaydarov of the Institute of Oriental Studies, Tashkent;
• Professor Zamira Muratalieva of Russian Slavic University, Bishkek;
• Ambassador A. Isaev of the Kyrgyz Republic in India;
• Mr Habibullo Mirzozoda, Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy of the Republic of Tajikistan in India;
• Professor Laura Yerekesheva, of the Al Farabi National University, Almaty;
• Mr Khashinov Director of Transport and Logistics Department of the MIFT Uzbekistan;
• Mr A. Abduvakhid, Tashkent;
• Mr. Arash Younisi President Balkh Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Afghanistan;
• Mr. Mansurov of the Uzbek Embassy in India;
• Ms. Catherine Lemery of the Embassy of the United States to India;
• Mr. Jason Wilcox of the Embassy of the United States to India;
• Capt. Alok Bansal (retd) India Foundation;
• Ambassador Amar Sinha (retd);
• Maj Gen G. Jaishankar (retd);
• Maj Gen B K Sharma (retd);
• Ambassador Ashok Sharma (retd);
• Professor Rajan Harshe (retd) former Professor in the Central University of Hyderabad and Vice Chancellor of Allahabad University;
• Prof. Sanjay Pandey SIS-JNU;
• Mr. Dipanjan Roy Chaudary Diplomatic Editor Economic Times;
• Dr. Uttam Sinha MP-IDSA;
• Prof. Mahesh R. Depata JNU;
• Dr. Pravesh Gupta VIF;
• Vice Adm Shekhar Sinha (retd) India Foundation;
• Dr. Sunil Kumar;
• Mr. Pankaj Tripathi;
• Ms. Kajal Katariya, Shiv Nadar University;
• Prof. Govind Inakhiya, BHU;
• Prof. H.N. Topo, Jadavpur University;
• Dr Jyotsna Choudhri, Managing Director of Breeze-India Group of Companies, Delhi;
• Dr Kamala Kumari Assistant Professor Delhi University;
• Dr. Raj Kumar Sharma JNU;
• Dr. Ved Pratap Vaidik journalist;
• Gp Capt R. K. Singh (retd ) and
• Mrs. R.K Singh;
• Mr. Ashish Nair, OSAI;
• Mr Shreeram, Director (retd) CII;
• Brig. Devinder Singh (retd);
• Mr. Navjot Singh U.S. Embassy;
• Mr. Ashok Pandey IAS (retd);
• Mr. Rajan Arya Pentagon Press, Delhi; amongst others.

A renewed outreach by India to develop closer ties with Central Asia has become imperative. This is important not only by itself in security, strategic and economic terms, but also as an increasingly important element of India’s long-term relations with Afghanistan. As Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan grows, riding on the back of the Taliban, India needs to further strengthen its links within Afghanistan as also with Iran, Russia and Central Asia.  There are clearly significant differences within the Central Asian Republics (CARs) and more so between them and Afghanistan. However, from the standpoint of policy formulation, there is an underlying interlinked, structural coherence for India.

(Source: Maps of India)

To begin by stating the obvious, the CARs are landlocked like Afghanistan; but more importantly, the populations have goodwill towards India and would like to see India more actively engaged as a balancing force. For Afghanistan, the balancing would continue to be vis-à-vis Pakistan, as the Pak ISI seeks to turn Afghanistan into a client state or one where it wields disproportionate influence through its proxy – the Taliban leadership, which it shelters and manipulates. For the CARs, India could be a balancing force vis-à-vis China as the growing economic clout of China looms ever larger over these countries, particularly their fragile economies. It is a given that no sovereign nation wants to be too dependent on another, or have a one-sided relationship that restricts its decision-making ability.

The policy focus for India with regards to the CARs, therefore, suggests itself automatically. The policy most likely to bear early results is one that prioritizes economic relations. To delineate this more narrowly within the economic domain, it would, in a nutshell, be focused on: adding dynamism to business-to-business relations between India and the CARs. And that too quickly as time is of essence. On the face of it, this seems straightforward, but the devil lies in the detail. The constraints are numerous starting with the above-mentioned landlocked nature of the countries impacting a free-flowing trade, and more so the track record has not been noteworthy. In fact, the record of India-aided projects in CARs has been dismal. Overcoming these two constraints relating to: (i) means and ways of transportation; and (ii) efficiency in the execution of joint projects, as we have demonstrated in the past 17-18 years in the case of Afghanistan, hence become critical.

Points to consider, measures suggested:

Facilitation by Indian Missions in CARs and Afghanistan to enable Indian businesspersons to increasingly use Chabahar port in Iran in addition to the Bandar Abbas port. A brief case study as illustration: Flamme Corp has been importing food grains from Uzbekistan to India on a regular basis. In April 2018, it imported two containers of food items to India through Afghanistan trying to avail the services of Chabahar port. However, due to some reason the two containers were detained at the Hairaton border in Afghanistan. When the company head approached (13/04/18) the Afghan Embassy in Tashkent to seek Visa so as to visit Afghanistan and resolve the matter, he was advised to get a supportive letter or a telephone call from the Indian embassy in Tashkent. Unfortunately, he could not be helped by our Mission. Then his local partner, an Uzbek company, approached the Uzbek Embassy at Mazar-e-Sharif. The Uzbek Consulate Head in Mazar promptly visited Hairton Customs and resolved the issue, thereby returning the containers to Uzbekistan. The containers were then routed through the Bandar Abbas route.

The point being highlighted here is that unless the concerned Indian Missions & other offices down the line are sensitized to accord importance to strengthen trade relations in general, and especially to encourage the use of Chabahar port, operationalisation of the port will not be as envisaged. Simultaneously, businesspersons already invested in trading with CARs need to be encouraged by conveying that their trading activities with the region would be facilitated. Institutions such as ‘The India-Central Asia Foundation’ (ICAF) can play a role in facilitating Indian businesspersons, who have trading links with the CARs, by acting as a reliable link with the Ministry of External Affairs and other ministries.

The usual seaport for Indian businesspersons trading with the CARs has been Bandar Abbas. However, due to the U.S. sanctions, its use has been restricted resulting in lower trade volumes with CARs (Indian businesspersons are not being issued BRC – Bank Realisation Certificates – by Indian banks). Chabahar port, on the other hand, is not under U.S. sanctions and is closer to India’s west coast, to ports like Mundra and Nhava Sheva. Chabahar port can in the present circumstances be promoted to access the CARs and beyond, more effectively.

Chabahar’s salience for us increases further in view of the growing Chinese footprint in Iran. It is, therefore, suggested that meetings with a logistics company working in India, Iran, Afghanistan, CARs and Caucasian countries can be held to explore ways to do this. Understanding with the logistics company would not be to manage the port, but only to facilitate inter-country trade using the port. Such an arrangement could help, to a large extent, smoothen frictions relating to trade between India and Iran, India and Afghanistan and India and the CARs.

Due to the ongoing COVID-19 Pandemic, the transportation of goods between the CARs and India and vice versa has become more difficult and fraught. Cargoes between India and the CARs through the sea route have declined sharply. Further, the passenger-cum-cargo flights have almost entirely stopped. To illustrate, the following passenger and cargo flights were in operation till March 2020:

Passenger flights, these also carry commercial goods:

• Tashkent-Delhi-Tashkent (five flights in a week by Uzbek Airways)
• Tashkent-Amritsar-Tashkent (two flights in a week by Uzbek Airways)
• Tashkent-Mumbai-Tashkent (two flights in a week by Uzbek Airways)
• Almaty-Delhi-Almaty (seven flights in a week by Astana Airways)
• Bishkek-Delhi-Bishkek (once in a week, but irregular, by Kyrgyz Airways)
• Dushanbe-Delhi-Dushanbe (once in a week, but irregular, by Tajik Airways)

Cargo flights:

• Tashkent-Delhi-Tashkent, as per need.

All these flights have stopped, except for cargo flights from Tashkent on a weekly basis. Such a dire situation, however, also presents an opportunity to reassess and quickly overhaul trade relations. 

As stated above, currently, the favourite route for exports from India to Central Asia is through Iran’s Bandar Abbas port, and from there on via Turkmenistan. The unpredictable nature of dealings at the Turkmen border, as the Turkmen authorities do not provide regular transit passage through railways or roadways, results in cargo loaded in railway wagons and in containers left stranded at the Sarakhs (Iran) – Serakhs (Turkmenistan) Check Point on the Iran-Turkmenistan border.

At the Torkham border post in Pakhtunkhwa (Pakistan) the situation is often much worse. Depending on the ground situation, transit passage for trucks going to Wagah-Attari border check point gets obstructed. Since July 15, a restricted number of trucks (20-25 trucks, mostly carrying black raisins, Liquorice roots or Mulethi, Almonds, carrom seeds, etc.) have started arriving at the Attari border post from Afghanistan. However, this route is entirely dependent on the mercy of the Pakistani authorities, who tend to close it on the slightest pretext.

To avoid such problems, if Chabahar port is promoted and a reputed logistics company involved to tide over the nitty-gritties and paperwork, access to the CARs will become significantly easier.  Afghanistan can be a transit point for transportation of goods to the CARs and vice versa. In the process, the Afghan economy gets a boost in the form of increase in transit fees collections. It would also provide employment opportunities to the Afghan people as their help would be required for the trans-shipment process and to handle the increase in cargo.

Onwards from Afghanistan, to CARs and even to Eastern Europe, India can depend on the Uzbek high-speed railway track. Uzbekistan has developed an excellent but little utilised railway track for regular scheduled movement of high-speed freight trains from Tashkent (Uzbekistan) to Hairaton (Afghanistan). From Tashkent, in turn, there is excellent rail and road connectivity to the other Central Asian countries and onwards to Russia and Eastern Europe.

Strategically, use of a Nhava Sheva (or any other Indian port) – Chabahar – Hairaton – Tashkent route would also mean an alternative to China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ (OBOR) initiative in the region. It would undercut the potential of the Chinese-developed Gwadar port, which is only about 70 km from Chabahar. Easily accessible from India’s western coast, Chabahar would be part of a larger Indian-supported transport corridor. The Indian-built, 193-km Zaranj (on the Iranian border) – Delaram (in Afghanistan’s Nimruz province) highway links up with Iran’s new connecting road from Zaranj down to Chabahar. In addition, India is involved in Chabahar-Faraj-Bam rail link and in a railway from Chabahar to Zahedan, on the Iran-Afghan border.

Chabahar port has not been popular among the Indian business community due to relatively weak logistical services & infrastructure and a lack of dissemination of proper information about the port. As a result, the objectives behind investing in the port have dimmed. To promote Chabahar, therefore, the government could consider giving rebate on transportation using this port. This rebate could be based on the notion of freight equalisation i.e. the freight charges incurred on sending a container (40 feet) from an Indian port, say Nhava Sheva, to Uzbekistan via Chabahar should not be higher than that via the Bandar Abbas route (currently, the freight from India to Uzbekistan amounts to around USD 5000.00). This would be a temporary measure for a few years, and could be discontinued once the traffic through Chabahar increases and logistics efficiency improves. It is quite probable that, over time, transportation of Indian exports and imports to and from the CARs via Chabahar becomes considerably cheaper.

(Source: Chabahar: Gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia, Brahma Chellaney, The Hindustan Times, April 26, 2018)

Besides promoting and incentivising the sea-road-rail routes using the Iranian ports of Bandar Abbas and Chabahar, the other trading option for India that needs to be developed simultaneously, is the air route. Easy flight connectivity between India and the CARs and creating an Air Corridor, as with Afghanistan, would go a long way in promoting trade between India and the CARs and significantly enhance India’s outreach to the CARs. Establishment of Air Corridors with the CARs can be the quickest way to give impetus to India-CARs trade. The issue of supporting this in the initial period needs to be considered on lines similar to what has been attempted between India and Afghanistan. India along with USAID is providing a special tariff at the rate USD 0.50 per kg for transportation of commercial goods and weekly flights are arranged from India to a number of cities of Afghanistan. A special tariff of USD 1 per kg, for example, could be considered with respect to the CARs.  

The CARs could also be considered as preferential bilateral trade partners. This would have a marked impact on trade volumes and India would be able to increasingly compete with China in a number of items in the region. For instance, a recent newspaper article mentioned that mining activity in Karim Nagar (Telangana) was getting adversely impacted due to the absence of Chinese buyers. Karim Nagar is known for Granite mining. Chinese companies purchase Granite Blocks from Khamam, Mattur (Parkasham), Ongal and other locations, and process the material from these blocks in China and then sell it in Central Asia, Europe and the U.S. Value addition in India in the case of such limited natural resources will also add to job opportunities locally besides enhancing trade. Besides Granite, there are other minerals China buys from India, processes these cheaper and then sells in Central Asia and Russia at a competitive price.

In the meanwhile, till preferential/free trade deals are signed, extending trade privileges to the CARs on a mutually beneficial basis could be considered. Such arrangements will act as a pushback against Chinese trade dominance in the region.

Improved access to the CARs would also reduce distortions in trade to the benefit of all partners in the long run. For example, India is importing approximately 500 tons of Asafoetida, in which 450 metric ton approximately is imported from Afghanistan and 50 metric ton is imported from Iran, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan. Total net Asafoetida crop of Afghanistan was around 50 to 70 metric tons in 2019 and the rest 400 MT was imported by Afghanistan from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and then imported by India from Afghanistan. For imports from Afghanistan, custom duty is free due to a preferential bilateral trade agreement (Zero duty is paid following issue of Afghanistan origin certificate). So, India is the main buyer of raw Asafoetida (Hing) from the CARs. The average price is around USD 100 per kg and the total import is approximately 500 MT per year. The total value, therefore, comes to around USD fifty million (50,00,0000). 

If a preferential trade status is accorded to the CARs, then Central Asian origin goods will start coming directly to India in increased volumes, which will not only boost economic relations with the CARs but also add to revenue earned by Afghanistan, acting as a transportation hub. Similarly, Indian exports of tea, medicines, garments and engineering goods, spare parts will get a boost. With a trade agreement in place, we could also start competing for market share in new areas.  For instance, China is the largest exporter of steel to the CARs and Russia. While currently it is difficult for India to compete in this fairly large and growing market due to poor logistics and the levying of production cess and other taxes on steel, if duty drawback is permitted for steel exports to the CARs, at least for five years, Indian steel products can also be expected to gain a significant market share in the CARs and Russia. Some form of restriction on exporting iron ore to China may also help.

An illustrative list of goods exported to CARs from India is as follows:

1. Pharmaceutical products
2. Mechanical equipment
3. Vehicle parts
4. Optical instruments
5. Surgical instruments
6. Surgical accessories
7. Refrigerator parts, including for assembling refrigerators in Uzbekistan
8. Cosmetics
9. Hair oil, Dry Mehndi powder
10. Garments
11. Fabric
12. Marble Slabs
13. Granite Slabs
14. Chemicals
15. Pesticides
16. Insecticides
17. Animal Feed Soya DOC (De-oiled Cake)

Imports from CARs:

1. Asafoetida (Hing)
2. Agricultural products
3. Green Moong
4. Yellow Peas
5. Red lentils (Mansoor Dal)
6. Kidney beans
7. Chickpeas
8. Liquorice roots
9. Valeriana Wallichi (Tagara)
10. Shilajit
11. Honey
12. Potash (India Imports 9 million tonnes annually, Uzbekistan is one of the largest producers)
13. Hydrogen Gas
14. Radio Active Elements
15. Asbestos
16. Precious metals
17. Rare Earth metals
18. Metal ores
19. Ferrous/Non-Ferrous metal scrap
20. Skin Hides Raw and Semi Processed
21. Animal Guts
22. Sheep Wool
23. Industrial Chemicals
24. Anthracite Coal (High Calorie Coal)
25. Dry fruits
26. Fresh fruits

There exists potential to procure a number of other products from the CARs, as per market demand. The CARs can provide an alternative for sourcing some metallic and chemical products. For example, newspapers recently reported that Indian air conditioner manufactures have been facing difficulties as most of the components are imported from China, including Compressors and Copper Metallic Tubes, for which we are fully dependent on China. India can alternatively procure these items also from the CARs.

As “CHAMP” (The USAID Commercial Horticulture and Agricultural Marketing Program) is promoting Indo-Afghan business, similarly ICAF, in coordination with the MEA, can play an important role in promoting economic and cultural relations with the CARs. (Business-to-Business meetings are facilitated by CHAMP, supported by USAID and India. It also monitors progress of B2B meetings and tries to resolve outstanding issues between companies.)

In addition to trading activity, an area that has significant potential to further India-CARs ties is the already expanding sector of Medical Tourism. This again is similar to India’s ties with Afghanistan. There exists a big demand in the Central Asian region for specialised medical services that cities like Delhi and Mumbai can offer. Regular flights and visa facilitation for the purpose would help. Another area that could be explored with renewed energy is that of film shooting. CARs are endowed with immense natural beauty and could provide interesting locales at reasonable cost for the dynamic Indian film industry. Tie-ups with various National Film Boards such as the Uzbekistan Film Commission to facilitate shooting of Indian films could prove to be beneficial.

During the course of a renewed outreach, it would need to be kept in mind that the five CARs differ significantly in socio-economic terms, and within a broad policy framework towards the region, India’s relations with each would have to be nurtured separately. Further, a broad understanding with Russia regarding the outreach/initiative would be useful. Geopolitically, among the CARs, Uzbekistan is of critical importance. With President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the country has started playing a distinctly more open and active role in the region and internationally. Building economic links with Uzbekistan and the other CARs would have strategic bearing, including on our ties with Afghanistan.

Summary: Way Forward

• Issue directives to all Indian missions in the CARs, Iran and Afghanistan to focus on promoting bilateral trade between their respective countries and India and proactively help Indian businesspersons involved in exports to CARs and imports from CARs. Organize Business-to-business meetings biannually at their locations. To check cargoes coming in given the past record of resorting to smuggling, the rate of inspection can be doubled.
• Engage the Turkmen government to facilitate transit of Indian goods travelling between the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas and other Central Asian countries and Russia through the Serakhs Check Post.
• Promote Chabahar as a port of preference to trade with the CARs. Engage a suitable logistics firm at the port to smoothen trade flow.
• Establish Air Corridors between Delhi and Amritsar and the CARs (Tashkent; Almaty; Dushanbe & Bishkek). All these sectors have had regular and chartered flights. A combination of air (for most products) and land-sea-land route (for bulk items such as polished Granite) would be optimal.
• Provide impetus to non-trading areas of economic cooperation such as Medical Tourism and Film making.
• It would be ideal to coordinate India’s renewed economic outreach to the CARs with Russia.

***

(Based on discussion with Indian businessperson Sunil Kumar, Director, Flamme Corporation on the subject on March 7, June 12 and July 31)

Other references:

Chabahar: Gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia, Brahma Chellaney, The Hindustan Times, April 26, 2018

Dr. Yelena I. Rudenko,
Senior Research Fellow,
Department of Central and South Asia,
R.B. Suleimenov Institute of Oriental Studies,
Almaty (Kazakhstan)

The issues of expectably or unexpectedly changed political and economic situations as well as of intraregional rivalry resulting in reciprocal loses occupy their due place in world science. One of the most vivid examples of the first case are Central Asian republics which after the collapse of the USSR suddenly entered global arena as full-fledged political and economic subjects (though many considered and consider them as objects), having clear desire to cooperate with almost everybody without any noticeable prejudice. The second case is represented by India and Pakistan, which also were eager to intensively cooperate with Central Asian states in various spheres, but due to some reasons remained without any tangible gains. In this regard, both Central and South Asian sides rather lost than succeeded. This paper is an attempt to briefly discuss and analyse some reasons of such a nuisance, which go back to the Soviet period but even more to the initial years of sovereign existence of Central Asian states.

Keywords: South Asia, Central Asia, cooperation, confrontation

Introduction

For a long time since the very moment the Central Asian republics gained political independence, their representatives as well as representatives of India and Pakistan from academic, business and policy-making circles have repeatedly made and continue to make persistent statements regarding the need of expanding, deepening and overall intensification of bilateral and multilateral cooperation between the states of the two regions. However, until now such a cooperation remains just superficial, covering a limited range of standard political, cultural and to lesser extent economic spheres; it does not include many eligible, not to say tempting, aspects and is largely stable in the negative sense, that is, simply makes no headways. The author of this paper believes that one of the main explanations for this phenomenon – in addition to a number of objective factors of political-strategic and economic character (first of all, the Afghan issue and the absence for this reason of adequate interregional transport infrastructure) – lies in the very problem of uncertainty, contradiction of priorities of such cooperation from its initial stages.

In view of this, the author makes an attempt to briefly analyze the primary perception and relevant statements about the nature of interaction between the countries of Central and South Asia. Firstly, these perceptions and statements formed that very backbone of problematic cooperation that takes place up to the present moment without having achieved its final statefulness and completeness, and secondly, they have largely reached the present day in a unchanged form and are often simply repeated from year to year and from research to research.

At that, the author considers it extremely important to turn to some samples of Indian-Pakistani expert views and analytical historiography of mostly 1990’s and early 2000’s on the topic of interaction of Central Asian republics with the leading states of South Asia during the Soviet period and in the first years of the former’s independence. It should be said that though over the time, the “flashy” rhetoric gave way to more calm and balanced reasoning, but its nature undergo not too much changes, at least in key aspects. It should also be acknowledged that the Central Asian historiography on this subject almost is nowhere in evidence, and existing available oral and written statements of representatives of Central Asian republics are in many ways either tracings or mirror images of views expressed by representatives of India and Pakistan.

Soviet Central Asia and India versus Pakistan

It seems necessary to make certain digression into the past and begin the envisaged survey with consideration of links between the state formations of the two regions since the time India and Pakistan gained independence, because the contradictory perception of these links (despite all their seeming unambiguousness!) has its origins in the separation of previously virtually unified British India into a number of sovereign states.

Indeed, the significance, intensity and content of contacts between Central and South Asia during the Soviet period are estimated by researchers in different ways, depending on initial personal position, the starting point of analysis and the particular aspect of interaction under consideration. Thus, some scientists and analysts believe that Central Asia was at that time completely closed to the world, including for the states of South Asia, because respective parent states (Soviet Union in Central and British Empire in South Asia) blocked their connections and contacts with each other and in general with the outside world. Others, on the contrary, argue that although Pakistan was isolated from the Soviet republics of Central Asia due to political tensions between him and the USSR, but India enjoyed the obvious advantage of access to Soviet Central Asia, and what is more, it were the Indo-Central Asian centuries-old ties that formed the backbone of Indo-Soviet relations!

It should be noted that even with respect to India, the second, that is, optimistic, opinion refers primarily to cultural and scientific contacts, while the first, that is, pessimistic view corresponds with political-economic interaction. And even J. Nehru’s trip to the Central Asian republics in 1955 is considered by most researchers rather as a mere cultural event, although some Kazakhstani authors are of the opinion that this visit of Indian Prime Minister can be compared in economic terms with the significance of the Great Silk Road (Zhakenov, 2006, p. 26-27), and in political – with laying of present-day foundation of India’s cooperation with subsequently independent republics of Central Asia.

Yet the most objective view seems to be that even indirectly interacting with the Soviet republics of Central Asia, India was aware that they were both Soviet and Asian. That is why it could not offer them, say, her experience of mixed economy, but representatives of these republics were invited to the 1947 Inter-Asian Conference, during which issues of future development of all Asian states as a single historical, geographical and cultural-civilizational bloc were considered.

Though, it should be pointed out that some problems and contradictions that exist in India’s current interaction with the states of Central Asia have their roots yet in Soviet-Indian relations. Thus, as American researcher L.A. Veit wrote, the Soviet trade policy towards India did not bring the latter all these benefits that the rhetoric of bilateral trade agreements provided for, and some provisions on comprehensive political understanding between the USSR and India did not always fully correspond to reality. In fact, positive Indian-Soviet relations largely depended on external factors, primarily on China-Pakistan-American covert alliance in South Asia. In particular, during almost the entire period of India’s positive interaction with the USSR, the latter used it as a counterweight to China (Veit, 1976, p. 159-161) that, in principle, can be said about one of the implicit goals of modern Central Asian republics – to exploit relations with India with a purpose of mere containing the Chinese factor.

At the same time, contrary to widely held opinion that during the period of 1947-1991, relationship between Pakistan and the USSR was extremely negative and that therefore the Central Asian Soviet republics were completely closed for Pakistan, this provision cannot be recognized as absolutely true. Indeed, the relations of the USSR and Pakistan throughout virtually entire this period tended to deteriorate and even aggravate due to mutual discontent with both domestic and foreign policies, while Pakistan’s contacts with the United States, on the contrary, tended to strengthen. Nevertheless, at certain moments of that period Pakistan used to lose support of the United States and, conversely, experienced a warming of its relations with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the ambassadors of the USSR to Pakistan were sometimes representatives of Central Asian Soviet republics, that is, Muslims (Jalalzai, 2004, p. 320). Therefore, it is unreasonable to talk about the complete absence of contacts between Pakistan and the republics of Central Asia during Soviet period.

In addition, it is believed that the meeting of Indian and Pakistani leaders in the Central Asian city of Tashkent in 1965, which ended with signing of the Tashkent Peace Declaration, played a special role in perception of Soviet Central Asia by representatives of two South Asian states. Moreover, stressing the fact of Uzbekistan’s close ties with South Asian region which took shape long before the latter was divided into opposing states, the Soviet leadership got an opportunity to treat both Indian and Pakistani delegation that arrived in Tashkent in equally positive manner.

Thus, due to the ambiguous historiographic assessment of interaction of India and Pakistan with Central Asian republics during Soviet period, it is impossible to draw concrete final conclusions about how positive (in case of India) or negative (in case of Pakistan) was a role of that period in establishing Central Asian-Indian and Central Asian-Pakistani relations at the present stage.

India and Pakistan: who, what and for what needed in independent Central Asia?

Initial stages of establishing ties and development of cooperation between the two leading South Asian states and the newly independent republics of Central Asia were and are also assessed in different ways (and, unfortunately, only considerable mutual suspicions and accusations between India and Pakistan in this regard were always in place in amazingly similar and comparable manner).

Regarding India, the majority of Indian as well as a number of Pakistani researchers tend to argue that India was obviously not ready for the sudden disintegration of the USSR, weakening of ties along Moscow-Delhi line and the need to establish contacts separately with each of Central Asian countries to a large extent on a new basis. As Pakistani expert A. Rashid noted, “with the collapse of the Soviet Union, India had lost its major ally and it had few ties with the new Central Asian states… In South Asia India was hit hardest by the break-up of the Soviet Union and the independence of Central Asia” (Rashid, 1994, pp. 208, 219).

In addition, Indian and Pakistani researchers well understood that Central Asian republics also suddenly found themselves in a new situation. In the words of Indian scholar R. Khan, “the new leadership in the Central Asian republics obviously appear bewildered and overwhelmed by sudden realisation of their heavy responsibilities for nation building… They need considerable moral, political, diplomatic and above all tangible economic support from many countries” (Khan, 1992, p. 16) including, as it was initially sincerely believed by both sides, from India and Pakistan as well.  At that, “the speed with which independence came gave no time to Central Asian leaders to formulate polices towards their neighbours. Thus their relations with the rest of the world were dominated not so much by what they wanted, but by what the rest of the world desired to do with Central Asia” (Rashid, 1994, p. 209). First of all, this was due to the abrupt departure of the state from the economy in post-Soviet republics, the wake of private sector both in Central Asia and India, and the emergence of completely new market conditions of cooperation for both sides. In connection with this, Indian economist G. Sachdeva stressed that while during the Soviet period all contacts between India and the Soviet republics were carried out exclusively through Moscow, and the nature of Indian-Soviet trade and economic relations of that time largely determined the specifics of these contacts, then in the post-socialist period such relations with Central Asian states have significantly weakened: Indian private sector apparently lagged with benefit from economic transformations in Eurasia, and similarly, companies from the Central Asian region did not turned to noticeable advantages from significant expansion of Indian economy (Sachdeva, 2006, p. 72). Pakistani analyst M.H. Nuri added to this that though “these Muslim republics have been very recently baptized into the traditions of democracy, liberal values and free economy”, but new prospects for them will be based upon economic pragmatism, and not on political and ideological considerations (Nuri, 1992-93, p. 90), that is, not on any traditions of Soviet-Indian friendship.

Indian authors usually note that Pakistan, unlike India, well expected the dissolution of the USSR and from the very beginning was more prompt in establishing relations with sovereign Central Asian republics, becoming the first state to recognize their independence a few days before the official collapse of the USSR.

Pakistani side itself, in principle, has never denied this assumption. “The first to leap into the region in competition with each other for influence and leverage were Turkey, Iran and Pakistan” (Rashid, 1994, p. 209). “Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and many other countries are jostling for influence in the region which may soon put Indian claims in doubt” (Nuri, 1992-93, p. 76).

At the same time, although many Pakistani researchers admit that their country was indeed more ready and, as a result, more speedy in establishing new contacts with Central Asian states, but most of them note that India in fact also was very active in this regard. True, as early as January 1992, an Indian non-governmental delegation went to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in order to find out the prospects for cooperation between independent Central Asian republics and India. It is then that Indian experts also began to talk about a need to closely monitor all the changes occurring in the five countries of Central Asia so that India knew how to relate them to her own national and regional interests, taking into account the need to preserve peace, stability and security in the space of South and Central Asia.

In addition, India discovered certain advantage in various previously concluded Soviet-Indian economic agreements (including even India’s rupee debt not fully paid to the Soviet Union), which through inertia continued to be complied with for some time after the collapse of the USSR. So, on February 22, 1992, Russia and India signed the Protocol on India’s trade with the CIS states, according to which a share of Kazakhstan was 100 billion rupees. On the basis of this Protocol, India then signed a separate trade agreement with Kazakhstan – including with a view to prevent similar actions on the side of Pakistan.

Finally it should be noted that Indian analysts just ascertain the fact that over forty-year tradition of Soviet-Indian friendly relations helped their country in quick establishing new contacts with the now independent states of Central Asia, whereas Pakistani researchers consider this circumstance as a very important advantage that their country did not have.

Indian and Pakistani researchers also ambiguously assess the initial priorities in establishment of new relations between their countries and the newly independent Central Asian republics.

Regarding India, some experts are inclined to assert that economic aspect prevailed over political one: India was primarily interested in trade and economic cooperation with Central Asian states, and interpreted various political (including ethnic, confessional, etc.) factors only based upon her own economic interests. Other analysts, on the contrary, believe that during the 1990s, India seriously thought not about any attractive oil and gas sector in Central Asia, but about preventing the situation of political instability within the region – that is, politics prevailed over economy, and only when political situation in Central Asia proved to be stable, India began to pay due attention to economic relations with its countries.

It is worth mentioning that initially India has not intended to offer Central Asian republics her experience of economic development – a practice that was in place later on. That time Indians believed that these republics do not need to borrow and follow the Indian socio-economic model, since they can simply maintain their existed achievements in the sphere of material prosperity – mass education, full employment, health and housing provision systems, cheap public transport and so on, and utilize them in their further development. Moreover, as was stated above, many of both Indians and Pakistanis expressed clearly sceptical – and in fact correct – views that Indian image (including its economic aspects) in Central Asia began to change rapidly with the end of the Soviet period since, having an increased opportunity to freely choose partners, the republics of this region no longer had to rely solely upon India.

As for the initial prerequisites and priorities for establishing contacts between Central Asian republics and Pakistan, the overwhelming majority of researchers agree that political factor (including certainly the question of religion) was undoubtedly the dominant one.

So, according to Indian researcher P. Stobdan, “for a number of reasons, Central Asia became a key and crucial element in the formation of the post Cold-War foreign policy of Pakistan”. This manifested in the calls of Pakistani side to resume interrupted historical ties, up to the fact that “many Pakistani families try to link their ancestral past with Central Asia”, in the ideas of the ‘Muslim brotherhood’, since it was believed that “the Islamisation of the Central Asian states would strengthen and rationalise Pakistan’s own existence as a nation-state”, as well as in employment by Pakistan of religious factor in order to create personal ‘strategic depth’ in Central Asia (Stobdan, 1993, pp. 1109, 1112). Obviously, the latter reason has always been of special concern to India. In particular, some Indian researchers, as was expressed in the work by A. Dhaka, unequivocally decided that with the emergence in 1991 of five nominally Muslim neighbours, Pakistani politicians immediately drew in their minds the ‘axis of security’ stretching from Pakistan to Turkey (Dhaka, 2005, p. 152). Moreover, based on the analysis of certain statements of Pakistani side, some representatives of India have even formed an extreme opinion according to which Pakistan’s interest in this neighbouring region was primarily caused merely by its outspoken “sheer jealousy over India’s advantage vis-a-vis Pakistan in Central Asia… determined by its rivalry with India” (Stobdan, 1993, pp. 1109, 1112-1113).

Majority of Pakistani authors, as a rule, did not deny in this regard the priority of political factor, including in the way similar to how Indian side perceived it. For example, in the words of F.A. Hashim and A. Rashid, “Central Asia is going to play a very important part in Pakistan’s foreign policy in the future. If it is tackled in the proper way, it will balance Pakistan’s existing tensions with India” (Hashim, 1992, p. 19). Moreover, as proves work by N. Ghufran (Ghufran, 1997), some Pakistani experts even urged the leadership of their state to move away from excessive accentuation of political (along with religious) interests at the expense of economic factor, which otherwise had a negative effect both on direct interaction of Pakistan with the states of Central Asia and on its overall reputation in the eyes of the world community. And although some Pakistani representatives actually tried to demonstrate their state’s interest in the Central Asian region primarily from economic point of view, but such attempts were usually not very successful. However, the economic factor in Pakistan’s relations with Central Asian republics at the initial stage indeed took place; among other things, according to A. Rashid, “with the winding down of the Afghan war and Islamabad’s growing problems with Washington over its nuclear weapons programme, Pakistan hoped to revive its fortunes in the West by selling its new geo-strategic importance as the gateway to Central Asia for Western business” (Rashid, 1994, p. 214).

Thus, from the foregoing it can be clearly seen that two major South Asian states from the very beginning turned out to be relative rivals in Central Asia, although there were also statements about the importance and even necessity of Indian-Pakistani cooperation in this region. For instance, despite his rough anti-Pakistani statements, P. Stobdan finally with satisfaction cited his unnamed Pakistani colleague that “Pakistan is perhaps in a very good position to take the lead in getting countries like … even India to approach Central Asia not in a manner of competition but in a manner of cooperation” (cited from Stobdan, 1993, p. 1123). Unfortunately, such examples are rather a drop in the ocean.

In majority of cases, there can be made other examples of controversy about perspectives (as well as obstacles) of interaction between the countries of Central and South Asia, reflected in articles and studies by Indian and Pakistani scientists and analysts, but even more existing in the minds of representatives of business and government of their countries, including these related to the most recent years.

To mutual regret (but, possibly, also to some happiness) most of these and other conflicting opinions proved to be devoid of any valuable practical meaning. Will India, as Pakistani side was afraid of, be able to maintain its former attractive image in Central Asia? No, she failed – and even largely lost this image not only in Central Asia, but also in Russia (and let everybody forget about the once notorious Delhi-Moscow line). Will Pakistan, as Indian side feared of, succeed in dissemination of Islamic ideas ​​in Central Asia? No, he did not succeed – and even India itself can learn a lot from Central Asian republics in terms of sustainable secular values. Will India create in the eyes of Central Asians an unfavourable image of Pakistan as a source of multifaceted threat? No – this was much better done by the US after the events of 2001. Will Pakistan cooperate in Central Asia with China with prejudice to Indian interests? No – China manages well in this region without any Pakistani participation (and even without any serious trouble for India). Will Pakistan benefit from the membership of Central Asian states in the ECO? No, this organization has never been taken seriously by these states, and at present there is even a question of what is the use of joint membership of India and Pakistan in the SCO. And so on and so forth.

As the objective reality showed quite soon, only conclusions of Indian and Pakistani authors about the initial unpreparedness of Central Asian republics for sudden independence and about India’s loss of many it had there during the Soviet period proved to be true. Subsequently, India acquired back in all aspects much less than she expected herself and than Pakistani side feared of in this regard. Pakistan on his part merely did not acquire anything in independent Central Asia – if it can be said so, he came there empty-handed and remained with empty hands as well. In this regard, all the above-mentioned inferences, assumptions, let alone mutual Indian-Pakistani suspicions and accusations, proved to be more than vain. And while these two South Asian countries closely and distrustfully monitored each other’s actions and intensions in the Central Asian region, it can already be confidently stated that they both once simply found themselves as mere losers there. The Central Asian republics also suffered a relative loss, since in the long run they achieved neither from India, nor from Pakistan any of those mutual benefits that at that time they somehow hoped to achieve. Perhaps, the result could be more positive if intra-regional South Asian rivalry receded before the prospects of interregional South-Central Asian cooperation.

For the sake of justice, it should be noted that the views and opinions of representatives of Central Asian republics regarding their versatile cooperation with India and Pakistan also have always been and remain quite discrepant.

Thus, if some of them do not pay any serious attention to bilateral opposition of the two South Asian states and call for interaction with both on the basis of exclusively pragmatic interests, others warn against over-active cooperation with Pakistan at least in political and strategic spheres, considering it a potential source of Islamic and other threats for Central Asia.

If some in Central Asia express the need for cooperation with India and Pakistan in all possible spheres, others say that because of Afghan problem and the lack of adequate transport infrastructure, such cooperation in all or at least in some respects is impossible in principle, and therefore both South Asian states should for a while be excluded from the list of first-priority partners.

As for economic aspect of interaction with South Asia, some Central Asian representatives claim that there are immense prospects in this regard, while others call for better orienting to the developed West or at least to China, but not to the ‘poor and underdeveloped’ India and Pakistan.

Enumeration of such contradictory views and opinions can be continued further. At that, if representatives of Central Asian academic circles are more likely to adhere to positive, optimistic points of view, then businessmen and politicians tend to attach more importance to the negative sides. This is not surprising – while scientists and experts simply state the facts and freely search for prospects, representatives of the state and business are more focused on problematic aspects in order to avoid possible unexpected risks. The main problem, however, is that such a contradiction in almost unchanged form, unfortunately, exists by the present time and there are not seen any ways to end with it in immediate future.

Instead of Conclusion

Despite someone may not attach due importance to the discussed issues, but it is obvious that as their outcome, such confusion, muddle, incoherence, inconsistency and even rivalry in actual priorities of India and Pakistan in Central Asia and of Central Asian republics in South Asia, expressed in the views of their scientists and analysts, among other factors resulted and continue to result in the fact that relations of the two leading countries of South Asia with the Central Asian states are of stable but largely inconsequent nature. The most unpleasant thing is that so far neither India nor Pakistan has been able to formulate any precise and clear strategies for cooperation with the countries of Central Asian region in various fields. On their hand, the republics of Central Asia have never even raised the question of any need to formulate such strategies for interaction with South Asia.

Moreover, this short paper does not touch upon the issues of inconsistency in the perception by separate states and peoples of the two regions of mutual foreign economic orientations, internal and external political preferences, including membership in various interregional organizations and so on. Here one can also identify more than enough differences, which, among other things, cause overall weakness of interaction between the countries of Central and South Asia in the sphere of maintaining interregional security and positive stability.

Consequently, cooperation of Central and South Asia in various fields occurs on the principle of “here and now, and then come what may”, that is, without elaboration of any long-term programs and mechanisms for more steady and beneficial interaction (Indian ‘Look-North’ policy is also futile in the regard). Certainly, such kind of relationship cannot be effective, as is repeatedly confirmed by the reality.

Thus, it seems appropriate to stress that prior to any talks about what to do and how to act in order to expand, deepen and intensify cooperation between the countries of South and Central Asia, it is necessary to address those questions the answers to which have not been received so far. Is there indeed any need for such an expanded and in-depth cooperation (and not just notorious mutual understanding, good neighbourliness, stock membership in the UN, various bilateral documents signed and other secondary issues that have never objectively created neither troubles nor felicities)? If there indeed is such a need, how urgent it is and does it actually exist at the present stage (since reality indicates that so far the states of both regions are quite comfortable without it)? If such a need really exists right now, then which spheres should be started with, and which ones may yet not be paid undigested attention (since when the question of the need for ‘comprehensive and all-embracing’ interaction in all spheres is raised, then in reality it either results in absence of any perceivable interaction or such an interaction turns out to be amorphous and diffuse – in fact, this, unfortunately, is a case of present reality)? After clarifying all the top-priority areas for cooperation, it is necessary to start with identification of factors and circumstances that do and do not impede interaction in these very clarified areas – for example, the lack of interregional transport infrastructure is not an obstacle for political and strategic cooperation, while Indian-Pakistani frictions may not so much interfere with economic cooperation of both these states with Central Asian republics (for more discussions and recommendations in this regard see, for example, Rudenko, 2013). At that, it is desirable to pay special attention to the issue of not always correct and sometimes distorted mutual perception between the countries of South and Central Asia, discordant mutual views of the common interregional and international situation, because such errors and inaccuracies in perception complicate the common vision of the true picture of current and potential interaction as a whole. And only after all these steps are over, one can directly raise a question about what should be done (and what not to be done!) to activate cooperation in the initially identified and clarified areas.

References

Dhaka, A. (2005). South Asia and Central Asia: Geopolitical Dynamics. Jaipur: Mangal Deep Publications.

Ghufran, N. (1997). The Islam Factor in Pakistan’s Relations with the Central Asian Republics. In V. Grover & R. Arora (Eds.), Pakistan. Fifty Years of Independence: Vol. 2. Independence and Beyond: The Fifty Years – 1947-97 (pp. 366-381). New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications.

Hashim, F.A. & Rashid, A. (1992). The Future of Central Asia. Pakistan Horizon, 45(3), 7-21.

Jalalzai, M. Kh. (2004). The Foreign Policy of Pakistan. Kashmir, Afghanistan and Internal Security Threats (1947-2004). Lahore: Ariana Publications.

Khan, R. (1992). Emergence of Central Asia and Its Relevance to India. Mainstream, 30(24), 15-22.

Nuri, M.H. (1992-93). India and Central Asia: Past, Present and Future. Regional Studies, 11(1), 69-95.

Rashid, A. (1994). The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Rudenko, Ye. (2013). Problems on the Way to Closer Interaction between Central and South Asia. In R. Malhotra, S.S. Gill & N. Gaur (Eds.), Perspective on Bilateral and Regional Cooperation: South and Central Asia (pp. 425-436). Chandigarh: CRRID.

Sachdeva, G. (2006). Economic Changes in the CIS and Indian Response. In Cultures and Societies in Transition. India, Russia and Other CIS Countries: International Seminar Theses (p. 72). New Delhi: JNU and ICCR.

Stobdan, P. (1993). Looking Towards Central Asia. Strategic Analysis, 16(8), 1109-1124.

Veit, L.A. (1976). India’s Second Revolution. The Dimensions of Development. San Francisco: McGraw-Hill Book Company.

Zhakenov, D. (2006). The Role of India in Ensuring Stability, Security and Economic Co-operation in Asia. In A. Mishra (Ed.), Jawaharlal Nehru & Asian Co-operation (pp. 22-27). Almaty: Embassy of India to the Republic of Kazakhstan – Indian Cultural Center (in Russian).

This is in continuation of the paper, ‘Strengthening India-Central Asia Relations: An Approach’, ICWA, September 7, 2020. It has a narrower focus on enhancing economic ties between India, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan.

Within the matrix of India-Central Asia economic relations, probably the most critical subset that needs to be built upon is: India-Afghanistan-Uzbekistan ties, both within bilateral and trilateral frameworks. This is self-evident to an extent, as a large part of the shortest sea-land route from India to Central Asia (excluding the transit route through Pakistan) traverses through these two countries after passing via the port of Chabahar. The other major reason being the potential for joint collaboration these two countries offer.

Looking at the transportation/logistics issue first. The route passes through: Chabahar (Iran) – Zaranj (a border town in Afghanistan and capital of Nimruz province) – Delaram (a transportation centre in Nimruz province, on the Kandahar-Herat Highway) – Herat – Mazar-e-Sharif – dry port of Hairaton (in Balkh province, around 76 km from Mazar-e-Sharif, the capital of Balkh province), before entering the Central Asian region through the dry port of Termez in Uzbekistan, just across the Amu Darya from Hairaton. This route avoids the U.S. sanctions on Iran and the continuing procedural delays at the Iran-Turkmen border.  

(Source: Google Maps; screenshot – showing Mazar-e-Sharif and Termez)

A step towards operationalising this route could be taken by discussing the transportation/transit details with Forwarding & Logistics companies based in Uzbekistan and Iran. These discussions could be held at both, the institutional as well as B2B levels. A preliminary exploration held with some companies in these two countries indicates that these companies are willing, but concerned about security-related matters and the uncertainty associated with a less used route, especially given the prevailing ground situation in Afghanistan.

Interestingly, their concern is not only due to the fact that Taliban-dominated areas fall along the route, but also about being charged multiple times along the way by local warlords and at government check posts. They are of the view that the Taliban after taking money usually guarantee the delivery of goods and do not charge at multiple posts. This is a basic concern that would require resolution by adopting a problem-solving approach. Talking to the Afghan government through our Mission in Kabul to streamline toll collection/movement of cargo along the route might help. The transportation companies are ready to “pay once” for secure and safe delivery of goods. They are, however, wary of the uncertainty and the costs associated with multiple payments (at tolls and otherwise) while passing through Afghanistan.

These discussions with freighters/agents will have to be taken forward at both B2B and governmental levels so that a stable environment for transportation and forwarding companies can be built along the Termez – Hairaton – Zaranj route. Incentives such as a small discount on transportation costs for a few years could be considered, or a leading insurance company could be encouraged to come forward to cover the consignments moved along the route at reasonable charges.

Another measure that could be considered is: partnering/investing in the proposed expansion of Termez border post at the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan border. Uzbekistan is planning to develop an International Cargo Terminal for Central Asia at Termez because of its location and road-rail connectivity. It has the potential to become an important cargo transportation and logistics centre (Uzbekistan is a member of the Transport Corridor for Europe Caucasus and Asia – TRACECA).

(Friendship bridge across Amu Darya connecting Hairaton and Termez; source: alamy photo)

Under a trilateral agreement between India, Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, India’s participation in a Special Economic Zone at the Hairaton-Termez Border could be considered, which would be oriented towards the supply of agricultural and Fast-Moving Consumer (FMC) Goods and other related products as per requirements of the three countries. A similar trade zone could be created later at Zaranj (Afghanistan-Iran Border).

Positively assessing the potential for trade with Central Asia, Pakistan has, of late, intensified its efforts towards forging closer trading ties with the region, particularly Uzbekistan. In a recent meeting (Islamabad, Sept 10), Uzbekistan’s Dy PM and Minister for Investment and Foreign Trade Sardor Umurzakov and Pak Minister of Maritime Affairs Ali Haider Zaidi discussed establishing a trade corridor and providing Central Asian countries access to Pakistani seaports, including special terminals for Central Asian goods and a dedicated shipping fleet to handle exports from these countries. The two sides also discussed starting negotiations for a Preferential Trade Agreement and agreed to form a Business Forum for the private sector of both countries.

The understanding reached is for movement of inward and outward cargoes through three Pakistani ports that would function as transit ports for Uzbekistan: Karachi, Port Bin Qasim and Gwadar. Similar agreements are said to be in the offing with the other Central Asian countries. Consolidation of these routes would make it difficult for the Termez – Hairaton – Zaranj – Chabahar route to be viable. Already, Uzbek companies have started enquiring from their Indian counterparts whether their goods could be routed through one of the Pak ports. So, the need to quickly move forward with the outreach initiatives, including putting in place preferential trading arrangements, and operationalising the Termez-Chabahar route. The cargo handling capability at Chabahar may also need to be augmented once the port becomes active.

AFGHANISTAN

(Source: Nations Online Project)

Bearing both South Asian and Central Asian identities, Afghanistan is evidently the Gateway for India (and other South Asian countries – Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh) to trade with the Central Asian countries. India has worked successfully in Afghanistan in the last two decades building critical infrastructure through a number of big and small projects from the Salma dam (Afghanistan-India Friendship Dam) project to the Zaranj-Delaram road to numerous electric substations, schools and hospitals. The need now is to move up the economic collaboration ladder, and make it market-oriented. This could for instance, increasingly translate into support for the setting-up of suitable small-scale enterprises in Afghanistan.

Notably, the issue of economic growth and achieving a minimum level of self-sufficiency could be an important and positive element of the ongoing intra-Afghan talks. An area, which is most likely to see a synergy between the Afghan government side and the Taliban. Focused discussions during the talks on how to put Afghanistan on a positive growth path through the development of local entrepreneurship could be useful. It would enable India to continue to play an important role in supporting economic development in Afghanistan in a bipartisan manner and push the narrative in a positive direction. Even as fighting between the Taliban and the Afghan forces continues, a formal understanding to safeguard installations, infrastructure and economic units could be reached between the two sides.

Afghanistan’s dependency on neighbouring countries for FMC Goods and food items like vegetables is well known. Establishment of manufacturing units producing FMC goods and construction of greenhouses for vegetable cultivation could help Afghanistan exploit its economic potential more fully and also be more self-reliant economically.

India and USAID have been helping Afghanistan in exporting agricultural produce to India and other countries, thereby helping develop its horticulture/plantation sector. Large quantities of dry fruits and medicinal herbs are coming to India from Afghanistan. As a value addition to this trend of growing Afghan exports, it may be a good idea to set-up packaging units in cities like Kabul, Kandahar, Herat and Mazar. Packaging material plants are small-scale projects that can be established quickly. Besides the above cities, their setting-up at trade and transportation centres such as Delaram in Afghanistan could also be explored. Different grades of polyethylene printed packs from 200 gm weight to 1 kg, corrugated cardboard boxes and wooden crates are usually used for packaging of dry fruits and fruits.

Another Small-Scale Industries (SSI) sector India could help establish is that of: recycling. Currently, most of the recycling raw material is sent to Pakistan via Peshawar illegally at very low prices. For example, used vehicle batteries and other batteries can be used for extracting Lead metal and the plastic used in battery can be used as plastic raw material, as per grade. This plastic can be reused after making flakes, which can, in turn, be used to make plastic switches, utensils, etc. The processed Lead metal from these plants can be bought-back by India, or it can be sold globally. Other potential areas of recycling of community waste include: paper/newspapers to make tissue paper, toilet rolls, paper carry bags and packaging material; Aluminium utensils/cold drink cans to extract Aluminium metal (melting point 660 degree centigrade); metal scrap for making metal ingots and subsequently rolling plants could be set up for making iron rods, which can be used as construction material; old clothes for making Rugs, etc.

India can also help develop Poultry and Animal Husbandry sectors in Afghanistan. Currently, the country imports eggs to meet most of its domestic demand. Similarly, sheep and goat breeding are other areas with known potential. Breeding of Merino sheep from which good quality wool can be extracted can be explored. There exists a large demand in India and in the international market for Merino wool. Development of animal husbandry in Afghanistan, in turn, will encourage export of animal feed such as Soya DOC from India and in return India can buy Merino wool. Also, sheep hides can be exported to the Indian leather products industry or these can be exported after a basic value addition, as ‘Wet Blue Leather’.

Another area of collaboration that could be looked at is that of edible grade Poppy seeds. Economic entities in Afghanistan can be given licences by the Afghan government for production of edible grade Poppy seeds, which is in demand in India, being used in bakery, the pharmaceutical sector and as a spice. Currently, India is importing the same from Turkey, Spain and Italy after getting Import licence or clearance from the Narcotics Control Board. Poppy seed imports from Afghanistan could replace imports from Turkey.

It is time to support Afghanistan in diversifying its industrial base, after the growth in its export of agricultural products, by providing technical support in developing Small Scale Industries in the country and creating a buy-back market. Later, India could also consider extending support in setting-up mining, mining-related large-scale industries as Afghanistan is known to be rich in minerals.

India’s trade with Afghanistan has shown a promising trend for both countries and provides a positive backdrop for upscaling bilateral economic ties. Afghanistan’s exports to India were worth USD 359.47 million in 2018, according to the UN COMTRADE database on international trade (figure below). Two categories of products have an overwhelmingly predominant share (more than 88%) in Afghanistan’s export mix to India. These are: (i) Edible fruits, nuts, peel of citrus fruits, melons; and (ii) Lac, gums, resins.

Afghanistan’s imports from India was USD 354.28 million in 2018, according to the UN COMTRADE database on international trade. The trade between the two countries is, therefore, nicely balanced. Afghan imports from India show a more widespread base, and include: (i) Electrical, electronic equipment; (ii) Miscellaneous articles of base metal; (iii) Oil seed, grain, seed, fruits; (iv) Tobacco; (v) textile fibres and different types of fabric; and (vi) Pharmaceutical products.  

UZBEKISTAN

Unlike the trend of India-Afghanistan trade, India’s trade with Uzbekistan has been declining. Indian exports to Uzbekistan were worth USD 261.3 million in 2018 having fallen from USD 318.1 million in 2016, according to the Uzbekistan State Statistics Committee figures. These mainly comprise: (i) Pharmaceutical products; and (ii) Machinery. While India’s imports from Uzbekistan were worth merely USD 23.3 million in 2018 having fallen steadily since 2014 (There is a view among businesspersons that this decline in imports from Uzbekistan is partly due to goods originating in Uzbekistan being shown as originating in other countries). The current level of India-Uzbekistan trade is a far cry from the true potential of trade between the two countries.

In view of the decline in bilateral economic ties and Uzbekistan’s centrality in the region in both economic and strategic terms, it is imperative to adopt measures to address the existing bottlenecks, especially in the transportation domain; align policy decisions; and take pro-active collaborative measures. Uzbekistan Government has taken a decision to give transportation discount on Uzbek exports. An early alignment of India’s outreach with the Uzbek government’s initiative would be useful in promoting trade through Chabahar port as also via a potential air freight corridor between the two countries, as is in operation with Afghanistan. The initiative could have a significant impact on the trade volume between the two countries.

Till the late 1990s, Indian leather products and woollen/cotton garments were in high demand across the CIS countries. A passenger from Tashkent could carry a couple of leather jackets from a retail shop in Palika Bazar or Yashwant Place in Delhi and sell it back home to cover expenditure on the to-and-fro air fare. Currently, a large part of the Indian market share in the region has been taken over by products from China and Turkey. Lack of proper stitching; lag in updating design in a highly design conscious market; and growing expenses due to freight have been the main factors behind this decline. However, the potential to revive the export of leather products and garments from India to the region, including Uzbekistan, by adopting proper stitching, quality control and market update remains very high.

Reciprocally, India could source raw material (raw hides as well as chemically-treated ones known as Wet Blue Leather) for leather garments from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries. Processing of Wet Blue Leather could be upgraded in the country with Indian technology; joint ventures could be considered. A Business Forum, comprising business persons with trading links in the region and Commercial Officers posted in respective Missions, to provide feedback for revival of leather products and woollen/cotton garments, explore the market, develop a strategy and arrange B2B meetings would certainly help.

Favourable climatic conditions and fertile land make Uzbekistan a large producer of quality dry fruits such as Almonds, Walnuts and Pistachios, and fruits such as Blue Berries, Figs and different grades of Chia (Salvia hispanica) seeds. Due to an under-developed food processing industry, Uzbekistan has been unable to take advantage of this abundance of good quality produce so far, unlike for example what Turkey has done. India can play an important role in helping it process dry fruits as per global markets so that Uzbekistan can enhance its presence in the regional and global markets and increase exports to India.

Cotton is another sector that has immense potential for collaboration between Uzbekistan and India. Uzbekistan is the 7^th largest producer of Cotton, while India is the largest producer of Cotton and Cotton Yarn, globally. India is well known for its expertise in manufacturing Cotton Yarn. Notably, a number of Indians are working in Uzbekistan in Cotton Yarn factories. The Government of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has been expanding opportunities in a number of areas including Cotton-related Industries that would add to the country’s manufacturing and export base. For example, it is providing ‘land bank’ for cultivation of Cotton without any charge. The government has also focused on improving its ease of doing business ranking.

The main factors adversely impacting Uzbek Cotton production and exports have been: poor quality of seeds resulting in low yields; Cotton cultivation frequently impacted by disease, especially fungal spread; and use of child labour in Cotton picking resulting in EU boycotting Cotton imports from Uzbekistan. India could step in and help Uzbekistan by providing better quality Cotton seeds, including Bt Cotton seeds, share experience in soil treatment and in proper use of insecticides/pesticides to avoid fungal spread; and share available Indian technology in spinning and weaving to increase the proportion of value-added products such as high-quality Cotton-Polyester yarn. India can then buy-back the Cotton-Polyester yarn of different grades, which will make it less dependent on China. The bilateral Business Forum (mentioned above) could also help Indians export machinery for collection of cotton from fields as well as machinery used in spinning. There exists, therefore, significant potential for formation of Indo-Uzbek joint ventures for the production of Cotton and Mixed yarns as per global standards and the requirements of international market.

Another area that has significant collaborative potential falls in the engineering domain. Uzbekistan has some quality engineering units that Indian industry could collaborate with. For instance, the Tungsten Alloy plant at Chirchik in Uzbekistan manufactures cemented carbide tools (cutting tools, precision tools) of high quality. Such companies could be encouraged to start a joint venture (JV) in India to manufacture the same. Such JVs would also lower dependence on China for similar products.

CONCLUSION

Both Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, in their own ways, are in a phase of transition and have been reaching out to establish stable and trustworthy partnerships. By strengthening its engagement with the two countries with a focus on furthering economic collaboration at this juncture, India can forge mutually beneficial and reinforcing partnerships. As underscored earlier, the issue of economic growth and achieving a minimum level of self-sufficiency could be made an important and positive element of the ongoing intra-Afghan talks. It would not only enable a country like India to continue to play a critical role in supporting economic development in Afghanistan and push the narrative in a positive direction, but also lead to enhancing economic ties between Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics.

• Dr Sunil Kumar, Pankaj Tripathi

***

References:

Pakistan, Uzbekistan eye regional links, trade boost, Islamuddin Sajid, September 11, 2020, Andalou Agency

Afghan Peace and India’s elbow room, Suhasini Haidar, April 30, 2020, The Hindu

https://tradingeconomics.com/afghanistan/exports/india

https://tradingeconomics.com/afghanistan/imports/india

https://tradingeconomics.com/india/exports/uzbekistan

https://eoi.gov.in/tashkent/?2615?000

https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/top-cotton-producing-countries-in-the-world.html

Strengthening India-Central Asia Relations: An Approach, ICWA, September 7, 2020

Authors:

Dr Sunil Kumar, Director, Flamme Corporation & Member, India-Central Asia Foundation

Pankaj Tripathi, ex-Civil Servant, Principal Consultant, Sarojini Damodaran Foundation

STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF UZBEKISTAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE REGION-WIDE DEVELOPMENT OF CENTRAL ASIA

Today in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, we are witnessing and directly participating in the process of updating the centuries-old chronicle of friendship and good-neighbourliness between our countries.

For long, the Uzbeks and Kazakhs have been living in peace and harmony, providing support to each other. Time-tested fraternal relations and a high level of strategic partnership are enriched with new content. Over the past two years, we have managed to achieve significant results in the development of Uzbek-Kazakh relations in various fields and directions.

Due to joint efforts, a completely new atmosphere of political trust has been created. A breakthrough has been achieved in resolving many issues that in the past created obstacles to mutual rapprochement to achieve common interests in the further development and improvement of the well-being of our peoples. Trade, investment, transport, communication, cooperation, production, cultural and humanitarian ties, cross-border and interregional collaboration, interaction in the field of security and joint resistance to modern challenges and threats have been intensified and expanded.

A solid foundation has been created to ensure dynamic development of mutually beneficial and multifaceted cooperation based on the provisions of the agreements on eternal friendship and strategic partnership. The legal framework for bilateral cooperation has been significantly strengthened.

Today, we have all the necessary conditions for fruitful and constructive cooperation – deep mutual understanding at all levels. This was largely facilitated by the mutual visits of the heads of our states, which undoubtedly gave new impetus to further strengthen the strategic partnership.

Each meeting of the heads of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan is always perceived with great uplift and keen interest, since as part of these meetings the sides exchange views on many issues of mutual interest and reach agreements to further strengthen friendship and cooperation.

At the same time, meetings at the level of ministries and agencies have also become regular and cooperation between regions is actively developing. Border and inter-regional relations are expanding and deepening and new mechanisms for activating economic relations are being developed.

In this context, the First Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan Interregional Cooperation Forum, held with great success last November in Shymkent, marked a significant milestone in bilateral relations. The results of the Forum vividly showed the wide, yet untapped potential of Uzbek-Kazakh economic cooperation.

New approaches and trends in the interaction between our countries have led to the intensification of bilateral trade and economic and investment cooperation. Kazakhstan has a firm position as one of the largest foreign trade partners of Uzbekistan. Significant results have been achieved in the development of mutually beneficial cooperation between our countries in economic, trade, transport, scientific, technical, cultural and humanitarian areas. Bilateral trade in 2018 increased by 47 percent and reached $3.022 billion.

One of the key components of Uzbek-Kazakh relations is the cultural and humanitarian area, which plays an important role in preserving and strengthening inter-ethnic peace and harmony, cultivating a sense of mutual respect, mutual enrichment and further rapprochement of the peoples of our countries. The Year of Uzbekistan in Kazakhstan in 2018 is a vivid example of the development of bilateral cultural ties.

This unique event, organised for the first time in the history of many years of our fruitful cooperation, is a striking example of true fraternal relations between two close nations. We are actively working to organise the Year of Kazakhstan in Uzbekistan this year.

The level of successful and productive interaction achieved over the past two years fully meets the interests of the fraternal peoples of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and contributes to ensuring stability and progress throughout the region of Central Asia.

Such a breakthrough was made due to the political will of the heads of our states – Shavkat Mirziyoyev and Nursultan Nazarbayev – aimed at developing good neighbourly relations and strengthening and further deepening regional cooperation and unity of the countries of Central Asia.

The President of the Republic of Uzbekistan clearly and precisely defined that the main foreign policy priority of the country is to pursue an open and constructive policy towards its closest neighbours, solving the problems of Central Asia based on equality, mutual consideration of interests and search for reasonable compromises. All these efforts should be aimed at turning Central Asia into a region of stability, security and prosperity.

Achieving these objectives, as well as ensuring sustainable and dynamic development of our entire region, depends largely on how closely and harmoniously the interaction of the Central Asian states is built. In this vein, the partnership of our fraternal countries is important for strengthening regional stability and developing cooperation throughout Central Asia.

This applies not only to political, trade, economic, cultural and humanitarian cooperation, but also to interaction in the fight against major trans-border threats in Central Asia – terrorism, religious extremism, organised crime and drug trafficking.

We should note our close cooperation among international organisations, primarily the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), United Nations (UN) and others. We highly appreciate the level of mutual support while considering within these organisations the most important issues affecting the interests of Central Asia as a whole.

Among them, of particular importance is the creation of a Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (CANWFZ), as well as the announcement of Aug. 29 as the International Day against Nuclear Tests. The global community not only supported the aspirations of the Central Asian countries for a world free of nuclear weapons, but also acknowledged the merits of Kazakhstan in this process, which announced the closure of the test site near Semipalatinsk.

In addition, Uzbekistan supported the bid of Kazakhstan for non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council, as well as its initiative under the chairpersonship in the Security Council on organising a ministerial debate in 2018 on Building Regional Partnerships in Afghanistan and Central Asia as a Model for the Security-Development Nexus.

In this context, I would also like to note the joint implementation of the initiative of President Mirziyoyev in organising regular consultative meetings of the heads of Central Asian states, which is historical in its significance for Central Asia. This initiative was fully supported by President Nazarbayev and at the suggestion of the head of Kazakhstan, the first such meeting was held on March 15, 2018 in Astana.

It should be emphasised that this format is a good platform for the countries of the region to maintain a regular confidential dialogue and develop coordinated approaches on topical regional issues. The practical implementation of this initiative was made possible thanks to the strong commitment of the Central Asian states to the idea of common interests and responsibility for the future of the peoples of the region.

The adoption of the UN General Assembly resolution titled “Strengthening regional and international cooperation to ensure peace, stability and sustainable development in the Central Asian region” in June 2018 was of utmost significance. This decision was an important step in the development of Central Asia as a common, consolidated region, states of which are capable of jointly solving common problems and ensuring the prosperity of its multi-million population.

The countries of Central Asia also became co-authors of the UN General Assembly Enlightenment and Religious Tolerance resolution adopted in December2018. The resolution is aimed at promoting peace, mutual respect, tolerance and integration, the purpose of which is to strengthen and ensure religious freedom, protect the rights of believers and prevent discrimination.

Today, Central Asia is no longer a periphery of world politics. Every year, the region attracts the increasing attention of the global community and key actors of international relations. This is also facilitated by the growing activity of the countries of the region and their involvement in the discussion and resolution of the most important issues of regional and global politics.

These successes were achieved thanks to the joint efforts and mutual support of the countries of the region, including Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, to regional initiatives.

In this context, I would like to note similar positions of the leaders of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, who consistently advocate for strengthening regional partnership, deepening integration in various sectors of the economy and developing cultural and humanitarian ties.

Today, the process of creating broad opportunities for deepening and building up interregional cooperation and bringing it to a new level is underway. A new page in the centuries-old chronicle of friendship, good neighbourliness, mutual support and cooperation has opened before the states of Central Asia.

All these factors laid the foundation to implement new, major regional economic and political initiatives and strengthen the common interests of the countries of the region in the field of security and sustainable development, as well as the common cultural and civilisational identity of Central Asia.

It should be emphasised that our countries have a firm political will and are ready to work together to keep a trustful, open and constructive dialogue over the whole range of interaction-related issues and to make the necessary efforts to strengthen multi-faceted practical and strategic cooperation in all areas of mutual interest, bоth at the bilateral and regional levels with the active participation of all Central Asian states.

Abdulaziz Kamilov, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Uzbekistan

11.04.2019 19:59

Kazakhstan’s President to pay state visit to Uzbekistan

At the invitation of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev arrives in Uzbekistan on 14 April 2019 on a two-day state visit.

It will be the first meeting of the heads of state following Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s assumption of office as President of Kazakhstan.

In the course of forthcoming talks in contracted and extended formats, the parties are expected to discuss prospects of consolidating the bilateral relations of friendship, good-neighborliness and strategic partnership along with priority areas for interaction in political, trade-economic, investment, transport and communications, cultural and humanitarian areas, among others.

The Presidents plan to exchange views on the enhancement of regional cooperation and key issues in international affairs.

The two sides intend to adopt a joint statement of the heads of state and sign a package of bilateral documents aimed at bolstering the multidimensional ties between the two countries.

The Presidents are also anticipated to take part in the official opening ceremony of the Year of Kazakhstan in Uzbekistan, which will kick off with a concert of Kazakhstani art figures and become a logical continuation of successful Year of Uzbekistan in the fraternal neighboring nation.

13.04.2019 18:42

Darkhan SATYBALDY: “This year will remain in the memory of fraternal people as the year that will raise relations to a new stage”

On April 12, the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev received credentials from foreign ambassadors. Darkhan SATYBALDY is among them. He has begun his activity as the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Kazakhstan to Uzbekistan.

Following the ceremony of presenting credentials, the Ambassador shared his opinion with UzA correspondent.

– Close friendly relations are established between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Over the past few years, the trade turnover between our countries has reached 3 billion US dollars. By 2020, we are planning to bring this figure to 5 billion USD. Active work is underway in this area.

The President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev will arrive in Uzbekistan on April 14 on a state visit. This is one of the first foreign visits of the Head of our state, which indicates very close relations between our countries. During the visit, the official opening ceremony of the Year of Kazakhstan in Uzbekistan will be held. I think that this year will also remain in the memory of the fraternal people as the year that raised our relations to a new, higher level.

President of Kazakhstan arrives in Tashkent

14.04.2019 19:00

At the invitation of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev on 14 April 2019 arrived in Uzbekistan on a two-day state visit.

The Prime Minister of the Republic of Uzbekistan Abdulla Aripov met the President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev at Tashkent International Airport named after Islam Karimov.

After the welcome reception, the delegation of Kazakhstan left for the residence allocated for them.

As previously reported, this will be the first meeting of the heads of state following Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s assumption of office as President of Kazakhstan.

In the course of the forthcoming negotiations in contracted and extended formats, the parties are expected to discuss prospects for further strengthening bilateral friendship, good-neighborliness and strategic partnership, as well as consider priority areas of cooperation in political, trade-economic, investment, transport-communications, cultural-humanitarian and other areas.

The Presidents will exchange views on enhancement of regional cooperation and key international issues.

It is planned to adopt a joint statement by the heads of state, as well as to sign a package of bilateral documents aimed at developing multifaceted relations between the two countries.

The Presidents will also attend the official opening ceremony of the Year of Kazakhstan in Uzbekistan, which will become the logical continuation of the successfully completed Year of Uzbekistan in the fraternal neighboring country.

14.04.2019 07:00

“Effective bilateral cooperation between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is an important factor for stability, security and sustainable development of the Central Asian region”

The President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev gave an interview to Uzbekistan National News Agency – UzA on the results achieved, the current state and prospects for development of cooperation between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

– Thanks to the First President of Kazakhstan – Elbasy Nursultan Nazarbayev and President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev, relations between our countries have reached a new level. What are common goals and objectives facing Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan today?

– From the first days of independence, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan go hand in hand, supporting each other in difficult moments and sincerely rejoicing in success. We have built strong and harmonious relations, which are based on a single goal – the prosperity of the two countries.

The leading role in strengthening the strategic partnership between our countries was played by the First President of Kazakhstan Nursultan Abishevich Nazarbayev and the President of Uzbekistan Shavkat Miromonovich Mirziyoyev.

The leader of the nation invariably pays special attention to the development of relations with closest neighbors, therefore your country is included in the category of priority areas of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy. We will continue the course of further rapprochement of our peoples.

Currently, the main tasks are the expansion of trade-economic ties and deepening cross-border cooperation. Our countries have enormous opportunities in these areas. The two governments have set a goal – to increase the trade turnover to 5 billion USD by 2020.

The existing examples of productive and growing cooperation in the investment sphere, industrial cooperation, development of joint production meet our mutual desire to deepen economic cooperation for the mutual benefit of both countries.

Great prospects for partnership are seen in transit and transport area. For Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, which do not have access to the sea, the priority tasks are the improvement of transit infrastructure and development of transport cooperation with other countries.

An indicator of mutual trust is also the fact that Nur-Sultan and Tashkent consistently strengthen security cooperation. We face common regional problems: terrorism, religious extremism, illegal arms trade, organized crime, illegal migration and drug trafficking. The situation in Afghanistan, which increases security risks of our region, is also of serious concern.

All this requires us to take systematic, coordinated, proactive measures. Therefore, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are already establishing links between law enforcement agencies and special services of the two countries.

Cooperation on water issues is also of particular importance. It is gratifying that we regularly hold working groups’ meetings in all areas of water relations, including in close coordination with other partners in the region.

Traditionally, we pay special attention to further strengthening cultural-humanitarian contacts, which is positively perceived by our peoples.

It is significant that there are practically no issues between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan that could not be resolved through constructive dialogue. Relations between our countries are a successful and effective model of bilateral cooperation, which is an important factor for stability, security and sustainable development of the entire Central Asian region.

In my opinion, consonance of the goals and objectives of Nur-Sultan and Tashkent will serve as a powerful incentive for further strengthening our large-scale cooperation.

– It is known that Elbasy Nursultan Nazarbayev and President Shavkat Mirziyoyev have warm friendly relations. And how are Your contacts with the Head of Uzbekistan developing?

– Shavkat Miromonovich is one of the first heads of state who congratulated me on assuming the office of President of Kazakhstan. I am sincerely grateful to him for the kind words. As evidence of deep respect of the Uzbek leader for our country, I also consider the good wishes addressed to our Elbasy.

President Shavkat Mirziyoyev assumed the historic mission of implementing large-scale reforms in Uzbekistan and turning your country into a modern, internationally competitive state. His firm commitment to the consistent improvement of the public administration system, the liberalization of the economy and the financial sector, the modernization of all spheres in Uzbekistan is of genuine interest and sincere respect.

Shavkat Miromonovich devotes all his energy, knowledge and experience to the achievement of the goals set, I became personally convinced in this during our meetings.

A very detailed conversation took place in 2017, when I headed the delegation of the Senate of Kazakhstan’s Parliament on a visit to Tashkent. I am personally very impressed with the strategic approach of the Head of Uzbekistan to all key areas of the country’s development, his deep understanding of the situation in the region and the world. We have with him a common vision on all issues of bilateral development, which is absolutely important.

I am convinced that the trusting and regular contacts that have developed between us will further deepen the fraternal Kazakhstan – Uzbekistan relations.

– What results can be announced today following the Year of Uzbekistan in Kazakhstan?

– The decision on holding this landmark event has become a bright page in bilateral relations. The Year of Uzbekistan in Kazakhstan was held at a very high level. In our country, more than 200 events that contributed to the expansion and strengthening of contacts between people, institutions of science, culture, education, and business structures were organized.

The first forum of interregional cooperation of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan was successfully held. Following the forum, important documents were signed, providing for further development of interregional relations between the two countries.

I am confident that this format of cooperation will become an important factor in the growth of interaction between border areas, will accelerate the entry of business into the markets of our states, and will significantly enhance bilateral trade. Over the past year, the trade turnover between our countries increased by about 50 percent and amounted to 3 billion dollars.

I want to emphasize that mutual rapprochement of the two states is perceived by the peoples with great enthusiasm. Therefore, it is very symbolic that my first state visit to a brotherly country coincided with the opening of the Year of Kazakhstan in Uzbekistan.

– What do you expect from the Year of Kazakhstan in Uzbekistan?

– First of all, we hope for a wide response and involvement of Uzbekistan people in the events of the Year of Kazakhstan. It is important for us that every citizen of Uzbekistan finds something of his own in this grand event and will forever retain a part of Kazakhstan in his heart. Therefore, we have tried to make the program of the Year of Kazakhstan as diverse and rich as possible.

If business forums and conferences are especially interesting to businessmen and politicians, then educational exhibitions are provided for students. In addition, it is planned to hold many cultural, sports and tourism events.

The geographical coverage of the Year of Kazakhstan is of particular importance. Events will be held in all regions of Uzbekistan. Thus, we hope to strengthen interregional cooperation and human contacts.

Systematic work will be continued on already announced initiatives and projects in trade, cross-border cooperation, tourism, transport and culture.

We are also determined to complete the modernization of our checkpoints, which will significantly reduce the time for crossing the state border. Our goal remains the formation of a modern border and customs infrastructure. It is necessary for ordinary citizens, business, in addition, such work will contribute to strengthening the tourism potential of our countries.

In a word, we are ready to continue work in all areas of economic, socio-humanitarian cooperation with Uzbekistan.

All this will allow building new bridges of mutual understanding and cooperation. As the Uzbek proverb says: “Close neighbor – soul neighbor”. I am absolutely convinced that the Year of Kazakhstan in Uzbekistan will serve to strengthen the centuries-old bonds of friendship and good neighborliness between our peoples.

– Political scientists have been writing about the factor of Central Asia since the 1990s. Suffice it to recall the works of Brzezinski and others. But none of the critical forecasts came true. How do you see Central Asia in world politics?

– Indeed, since independence, many experts and observers predicted a predominantly negative development scenario for Central Asia. We were predicted to disintegrate, an uncontrolled increase in the terrorist threat, becoming a kind of “caliphate”, internal conflicts, economic and social collapse.

However, the forecasts of the Balkanization of Central Asia have not been realized. During the years of sovereign development, verified steps and decisions of each of the Central Asian states allowed maintaining stability in the region and, equally important, laying a solid foundation for long-term progressive development.

Today, Central Asia is experiencing a new stage of its formation. There is a tendency to strengthen interstate cooperation, a real search for mutually acceptable solutions across the entire spectrum of current issues. For this there is the main thing – the political will of all the leaders of our region, the readiness to develop cooperation based on the principles of good neighborliness and mutual interest.

In March 2018, the first consultative meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia was held in the capital of Kazakhstan. Without exaggeration, we can say that this event has become a new stage in regional cooperation. During the meeting, the basic priorities of the five-sided cooperation were identified and plans for the future were outlined. There has been a significant increase in the level of political dialogue between the Central Asian countries, and the proximity or coincidence of positions on most issues on the intraregional and international agenda has been confirmed.

The new dynamics of cooperation is already bearing fruit. In Central Asia, trade turnover has noticeably increased, air, road and rail routes are being opened, checkpoints are being modernized, infrastructure projects are being implemented. Intraregional economic relations are being strengthened, boundaries are being coordinated, water resource management and environmental issues are being jointly addressed.

The trends of regionalization and cooperation are an integral part of the modern world development. Even large and self-sufficient countries are building close interaction with their partners.

As world experience shows, it is vital for small and medium-sized states to create effective cooperation platforms and expand cooperation, without which long-term and sustainable development is impossible.

At the same time, it is impossible to interpret the natural convergence of our countries in line with any “bloc mentality”. The current positive process in Central Asia is not only beneficial for us, but also in the interests of the region’s traditional partners. Kazakhstan is open to all forms of cooperation with all interested countries.

A Brief Review of Kazakhstani and Russian Historiography on the Initial Stages of Central and South Asian Interaction

Yelena I. Rudenko,
Doctorate in History, Senior Research Fellow,
Central and South Asia Department,
R.B. Suleimenov Institute of Oriental Studies (Almaty, Kazakhstan)

According to quite a great number of researchers, the history of relationship between South and Central Asia is as ancient as the history of evolution of their own civilizations – hence, it is impossible to establish any exact (or even close to probable one) date for the beginning of interaction between South and Central Asia, since all available written, archaeological and other evidences, both direct and indirect, reflect not an origination, but only a certain period in such interaction, when interregional migrations over these territories had already become regular and intense. With the continual acquisition of new reliable information about the more and more ancient periods in the history of Central and South Asian regions, the starting stages of their relations move back all the earlier. On the basis of only reliable (not mythologized) data, the beginning of civilized interaction of these two regions can be dated back to the time of existence of the Harappan civilization in India and the first major sites of settlement in Central Asia. At present, it is deemed conventional to look for signs of this initial interaction in the contacts of representatives of the Indus (Harappan) civilization with population of the territory of modern Turkmenistan and also possibly with Andronovo culture settlements in the territory of modern Kazakhstan [Bongard-Levin 1980, p. 13; World History 1956, p. 690]. Active temporary trade contacts of residents of ancient settlements and state entities of Central and South Asia are evidenced by numerous findings of import-export goods; at the same time, it is necessary to distinguish between pure imported products and local ones which reflected various kinds of imprint of interregional mutual influence.

Moreover, the ancient Indians had been also involved in commercial expansion: thus, in the Amudarya, for example, there was discovered a Harappian “colony” – the ancient settlement of Shortugai A (2200-2000 BC) [Il’in, Diakonov 1989, p. 165]. And already in the III millennium BC the southern regions of Central Asia begin to play their intermediary role in the land trade of Indus cities with the state formations of the Middle East and later China.

During the III-II millennium BC, there has begun the exchange and assimilation of the primary scientific ideas, technologies and cultural-social values ​​between the geographically adjacent regions of Central and South Asia. Such the trade-economic contacts and exchange in technical and cultural achievements related to them contributed to the overall development of both regions. Thus, the architecture of many large settlements of the south-western part of Central Asia, which arose mainly after the heyday of the huge centers of the Indus civilization, resembles the architecture of the latter.

A well-known fact is that at the excavations in Harappa, there were found busts of Mongoloid type people. These busts should most likely be attributed to the representatives of the Tibet-Burmese ethno-racial group from the north-east areas of India itself, but it is not fully ruled out that population of the Indus civilization due to migratory contacts was also familiar with Mongoloids from the more remote regions of Central Asia. Moreover, according to some assumptions, the population of India and of southern regions of Central Asia, being Dravidian, was somehow kindred in linguistic and even racial terms (although it is hardly possible to consider as valid the attempts to identify the Dravidians – inhabitants of the Indus civilization with the “Proto-Proto-Turks” as, for instance, Kazakh researcher M. Barmankulov insists upon [Barmankulov, pp. 22-23, 167-177]).

If the decline of the Indus civilization only partially and yet without sufficient evidences is associated with the arrival of Aryan tribes to South Asia, then the Aryans may be deemed indeed “responsible” for the extinction of urban centers in the territory of Turkmenistan. Regarding this fact, Russian researchers support an opinion of Indian scholar R. Sankrityayana who notes that the very first contacts of the Aryans with the Dravidians occurred not in the lower reaches of the Indus, but in the region of Khorezm, which testifies to the obvious migratory presence of the first Proto-Indians (as Aryans) or ethnic groups related to them in the Central Asian region.

According to the assumption of some Russian, Indian and Western researchers who do not believe in the theory of India as Aryan’s homeland, the Aryan tribes began their movement southward from Central Asia. Some Kazakh scientists even talk about the Aryan tribes’ homeland in northern and western Kazakhstan, in particular, along the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea, just as some Kyrgyz researchers look for their origins on the shores of Issyk-Kul Lake. In this case, there is obvious unification and even muddle of Aryans and Andronovs (representatives of the Andronovo culture which covered the territory of Kazakhstan among others) and, moreover, of Aryans and Scythians (Sakas). According to the most common hypotheses on penetration of Aryans into India, such an assumption of their Central Asian origin can only be seen as partially true. Nevertheless, be the homeland of the Vedic Aryans and the whole proto-Indo-European community located somewhere in the circumpolar regions of Karelia and Scandinavia (the “Arctic theory of Somagiri” by B.G. Tilak), or in Western, Central, Eastern and Southern Europe, or in the steppes of southern Russia, in any case the western (Trans-Caucasian) and eastern coasts of the Caspian Sea should be deemed as one of the most important geographical corridors of migrations of various waves of Aryan tribes towards India.

Thus, R. Sankrityayana, tracing the path of the early Aryan wave to the territory of South Asia in time and space perspective, relocates the “Indo-Slavs” from Eastern Europe through the Volga region (VI-IV millennium BC), Central Asia – in particular, along the riverbed of the Amu Darya, the Fergana Valley and the Pamir (3000-2500 BC) to the north-western regions of India. At that, the researcher notes that on their way the Aryans met horse breeders in the northern regions of Central Asia and farmers in the south ones [Sankrityayana, pp. 7-10, 13, 25, 39, 47]. Here, however, it should be clarified that, following the Indian tradition, R. Sankrityayana pushes the arrival of the Aryans into the territory of India far back in ancient times. If we take into account the most common assumptions that the early period of Andronovo culture dates back to the 18th century BC and the beginning of penetration of the Aryans into India dates from the mid-end of the II millennium BC, then the latter could most likely pass through the territory of Kazakhstan at the turn of the III-II millennium BC.

In the course of their southward migrations, Aryans indeed used to stop and even partially settle on the territory of Central Asia, constituting an important part in Andronov and later Scythian (Saka-Sarmatian) ethnic formations that spread from the Black Sea and Southern Siberia to Afghanistan. It is well-known that various Scythian tribes lived in the vast territory of the Eurasian forest-steppe zone, and the direction of their settlement had been in line with the direction of Aryans’ movement to the South.

It is also known that in the initial period of its existence, the Andronovo community in Kazakhstan was considerably influenced by the Timber-grave culture of the Volga region [Baipakov 1993a, p. 19]. The reason for this, most likely, was the gradual movement of the Aryan tribes, especially since the Aryans’ archaeological culture exactly at the period of their arrival to India is called the Timber-grave-Andronov one. Another evidence of continuity of vary-stage elements of the Late Aryan wave is seen in the apparent similarity of material and spiritual cultures of the Alakul (Southern Transurals, middle of the II millennium BC), Tazabagyar (Khorezm, 13-11 centuries BC) and Bishkent (Southern Tajikistan, turn of the II-I millennium BC) [Guseva 1977, pp. 47-50].

Therefore, referring to the period of pre-Aryan and Aryan migrations, one should not even talk about the contacts of representatives of Central and South Asia, but rather about the presence of the same ethno-religious (and hence economic, cultural, etc.) elements in the territory of both regions. Actually, there are too mane evidences of commonality of these elements.

Firstly, the economic structure: predominately cattle-, mainly horse-breeding, combined with active deforestation respectively by Andronovs in the northern and central parts of Kazakhstan – to use wood for smelting, and by Aryans in northern India – in order to clear ground for agriculture which they had gradually gone over to.

Secondly, the strata organization of society: partitioning of population into Brahmins-priests, Kshatriyas-warriors, of which chiefs and kings were elected, and ordinary freemen among the Indian Aryans, Andronovs and Scythians (Sakas). At that, in nomadic Kazakhstan this stratum did not achieve its fully distinctive division into farmers, artisans and traders, as it happened in the southern regions of Central Asia and especially in India, which may be due to the fact that such a broad stratification was not necessary for the socio-economic development of the nomadic society [Ganzha 1991, p. 147].

Thirdly, the religious beliefs: deities with the same names, functions and even canons of representation – Mitra, Yama, Varuna, Anahita and – more distantly – Indra, Surya and Agni. Thus, often the images of gods of Andronov-Saka period similar to the supreme gods of Hinduism have many hands, so that, for example, many-armed Andronov-Scythian god on the bull may be related to Rudra-Shiva; there are also found the images of the Sun with spears as well as snake-haired deities of the Andronov period that have direct parallels with the canonical image of Hindu god Murugan, particularly, in South India [Rysbaeva, p. 30-31].

Fourthly, the cosmogonal and environmental attitudes: a three-tiered quadrangular cosmological world with gods-guardians of the four cardinal points; a deification of almost the same animals, especially wild beasts and birds of prey, and later – domestic cattle. Notably, in particular, is that the worship of mother-cow in Hinduism is associated with the presence among early Aryans of the bull cult similar to the aurochs cult in Central Asia.

Fifthly, the ritual practice: cremation of the dead, including use of red ocher as a symbol of fire; sati – compulsory and later voluntary widows’ self-immolation (or another type of suicide); similar seasonal ceremonial, for example, the king ploughs the first furrow in the beginning of the growing season; creation of gods statues, including movable ones, of tree in nomadic conditions and of stone in the conditions of settlement; reverent attitude towards fire-side; drinking intoxicating liquors – koumiss and araq (fermented mare’s milk), and subsequently haoma-soma that with the lapse of time in both regions began to pursue religious goals as well, etc.

Many common elements existed in clothing (thus, on the feet of almost all statues of the Vedic Sun god Surya there are still depicted the so-called “Scythian” high boots) and in armament (characteristic “Aryan” swords and mounted chariots used by both the Aryans and Indo-Iranians of the Central Asia). There were also obvious linguistic parallels explained by the same Indo-Aryan commonality. And some of these Aryan elements – in the sphere of both spiritual and material culture – had been later inherited by the Turks of Central Asia [Rudenko 2015, pp. 201-203].

It is noteworthy that the broad region for creation of the early parts of the all-Aryan “Avesta” included Turan or Central Asia as well; however, in this literary monument the Central Asian Aryans are not mentioned. In the proper Indian literature of a later period (“Aitareya Brahmana”, “Mahabharata”, “Ramayana”, Puranas, etc.), the Central Asian region is mentioned repeatedly. According to them, the territory of Bharat-Varsa (Ancient India of the Puranic texts) extends northward to the Amu Darya (Indiam “Vamkshu”), and the Hindu mythical mountain Meru is located in the Pamir. “Bhuvanakosha” does at all include the whole of Central Asia up to the Urals and the Yenisei River into the Uttarapatha – the extreme northern part of the Indian subcontinent. Thus, the long and intensive migratory waves of the Aryans actually for a certain time combined also the outlook of the representatives of Central and South Asia.

Turning to the question of interaction of representatives of South and Central Asia during the period of existence of interregional “external” empires, it should be generally noted that the political amalgamation of southern and north-western regions of respectively Central and South Asia within the Achaemenid Empire and then the state of Alexander the Great had a definite effect upon the relations between these two regions.

Of course, it is doubtful that such a merely formal administrative and territorial inclusion in both empires of certain regions of Central and South Asia (a large part of whose population most likely did not even know about this fact or did not attach much importance to it) could either promote or impede the increase in political, trade-economic, religious, cultural and in general migratory interaction between the two regions. The relatively centralized infrastructure that existed in the Achaemenid Empire may have facilitated trade relations along some areas between India and Central Asia, while conquests by Alexander the Great rather hindered the direct contacts of the subjugated parts of Central and South Asia (however, as is known, this obstacle was short-lived).

During this period, the entire space of the two empires has endured a somewhat different development of relationship between Indians and the representatives of Central Asia – not direct contacts, but trade-economic, social and cultural-religious interaction. Both of them met in many cities-centers of trade and on various trade routes. Thus, both Indians and Scythians lived in Babylonia (from the sixth century BC), in Alexandria and other cities of the empires of the Achaemenids and Alexander of Macedon [Weinberg 1989, p. 185; Bongard-Levin et al., p. 14]. Both of them served as mercenaries in the armies of various powers and performed garrison services in various territories, especially after India was politically lost during the last Achaemenids, and Khorezm, Sogdiana and the Saka tribes out of the subjects turned into the allies of Persians. The Persian and Hellenic civilizations also acted as intermediaries in the transfer of some cultural and religious elements between Central and South Asia. Direct contacts of South and Central Asian peoples also continued within the territories of their immediate settlement.

From the middle of the 3rd century BC, the Parthian and Greco-Bactrian kingdoms which have split off from the Seleucid state became a sort of buffer zone between the regions of Central and South Asia proper. At the same time, regular military conflicts between the two kingdoms as well as free both-sided migratory flows of representatives of these two regions constantly changed the population structures and areas of ​​the territories included in each of the abovementioned states, so that at some periods their eastern borders even overlapped.

The nobility in the Parthian and Greco-Bactrian kingdoms, including in their Indian territories, consisted of Iranians, Greeks and representatives of Central Asia per se. However, in the main, the role of these two kingdoms was reduced to the activation of cultural and religious processes.

First of all, it relates to the spread of Hellenism in the occupied territories, which led to the unification of many elements of material culture and scientific achievements within the significant areas of Central and South Asia. At the same time, the Bactrians were to some extent involved in the spread of Buddhism and early Hindu cults in southern regions of Central Asia. The Parthians and Bactrians also controlled all the branches of the newly emerged Great Silk Road on their territories and thus were active intermediaries in trade between the two regions.

Therefore, migratory contacts between representatives of Central and South Asia during the period of existence of interregional “external” empires continued both on the previous (from one region to another) and on the new (from both regions into the third one) levels, although they were mediated by extra-regional powers.

Thus, in unison with world historical science, writings by Russian and Kazakh scholars prove that the very initial contacts of Central and South Asian peoples and state entities – in certain periods deep and profound while sometimes just shallow and indirect, but in any case covering virtually all possible spheres of interaction – have laid down both spiritual and material foundations for future relations of these two regions.

References:

Baipakov, K.M. (1993). Bronzovyy vek [The Bronze Age]. In Istoriya Kazakhstana [The History of Kazakhstan]. Almaty: Dauir, 16-29.

Barmankulov, M. (1999). Khrustal’nyye Mechty Tyurkov o Kvadronatsii [Türks’ Crystal Dreams of Quadronation]. Almaty: “BIS” Social Foundation.

Bongard-Levin, G.M. (1980). Drevneindiyskaya Tsivilizatsiya: Filosofiya, Nauka, Religiya. [Ancient Indian Civilization: Philosophy, Science, Religion]. Moscow: Nauka.

Bongard-Levin, G.M., Bukharin, M.D., and Vigasin, A.A. (2002). Indiya i Antichnyy Mir [India and the Antique World]. Moscow: Eastern Literature Publishing House of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Ganzha, A.G. (1991). Innovatsii v Sisteme ‘Etnos-Okruzhayushchaya Sreda’ [Innovations Within the ‘Ethnos-Environment’ System]. In Etnicheskaya Ekologiya: Teoriya i Praktika [Ethnic Ecology: Theory and Practice]. Moscow: Nauka, 140-148.

Guseva, N.R. (1977). Induizm: Istoriya Formirovaniya. Kul’tovaya Praktika [Hinduism: A History of Formation and a Cult Practice]. Moscow: Nauka.

Il’in, G.F., Diakonov, I.M. (1989). Pervyye Gosudarstva v Indii. Predgorodskiye Kul’tury Sredney Azii i Irana [The First States in India. Pre-Urban Cultures of Central Asia and Iran]. In I.M. Diakonov, V.D. Neronova, I.S. Sventsitskaya (Eds.) Istoriya Drevnego Mira. Kniga 1. Rannyaya Drevnost’ [Ancient History. Vol. 1. An Early Antiquity]. Moscow: Nauka, 161-173.

Rudenko, Ye.I. (2015). Spiritual Unanimity and Ecological Morality of Hinduism and Tengrism. In Sanskrit Studies, 4:201-214.

Rysbaeva, G. (2005). Kone Zamannan Saqtalynghan Kunnіn Tanbalary [Sun Symbols Extant From Ancient Times]. In Qogam zhane Dauіr, 2: 30-35.

Sankrityayana, R. (2002). Ot Volgi do Ganga. Istoriya Ar’yev v Rasskazakh [From the Volga to the Ganges. The Stories on the Aryans’ History]. Moscow: Society for Friendship and Cooperation with Foreign Countries.

Vsemirnaya Istoriya (1956). [World History]. Moscow: State Publishing House of Political Literature. Vol. 1.

Weinberg, I.P. (1989). Predellinizm na Vostoke [Pre-Hellenism in the Orient]. In I.M. Diakonov, V.D. Neronova, I.S. Sventsitskaya (Eds.) Istoriya Drevnego Mira. Kniga 1. Rannyaya Drevnost’ [Ancient History. Vol. 1. An Early Antiquity]. Moscow: Nauka, 183-197.

Background:

Political Pandits (experts) are analyzing recently held presidential elections in the Republic of Kazakhstan. Some call it totally free and fair elections while others have raised some objections. But Kazakh voters have spoken loud and clear for Nursultan Nazarbayev on December 4, 2005. ICAF team was in Astana City as part of “International Observers” for presidential election. On the polling day December 4 2005, we visited four polling stations in Astana City and later in the evening visited polling station number 20 to see the counting of votes.

 Polling started at 0700 hour in the morning and continued till 2000 hour in the evening. We arrived at polling booth number 12 in Astana City at 1130 hour. Total number of voters registered at this polling booth was 1445 and by 1130 hour 40 percent had exercised their franchise. Voters used both printed ballots and electronic machines SAILAU. However most preferred printed ballots. Voters were standing in queue and waiting for their turn to cast their vote.

Voting in progress at Polling Station Number 12, Astana City, Kazakhstan

Initially there were eighteen candidates in race for presidential post; however five qualified to contest the elections.

1. Alikhan Baimenov- Ak Zhol Democratic Party
2. Mels Yeleusizov – Tabigat Movement
3. Nursultan Nazarbayev – Otan Party
4. Yerassyl Abylkassymov – Communist People’s Party
5. Zharmakhan Tuyakbai – For a Fair Kazakhstan Movement

Representatives of the five candidates were monitoring voting process on all polling booths to ensure free and fair electoral process. ICAF team interacted with Candidates’ representative to know their views about the voting process. All of them were satisfied with the arrangements made by the Central Election Commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan. In addition to Candidates’ representatives there were representatives from political parties and public associations as well.

 We moved to next polling booth number 13 in Astana City which had 1368 registered voters. We arrived at 1220 hours to this booth and came to know that 571 voters had exercised their franchise; only 107 voters used electronic machines SAILAU. Polling both Secretary Mrs. P L Alexanderovna told us that voters preferred printed ballots more compare to electronic machine. Perhaps they are still not very comfortable with electronic voting.

 We talked to some voters outside the polling booth and tried to know their preferences. Many openly supported Nursultan Nazarbayev while some refused to divulge their choice. However all of them were happy with the arrangements made by the Central Election Commission of Kazakhstan.

 We decided to go from centre of Astana City to outskirt of the city to see the voter’s response in rural area. It took us 20 minutes by car to reach polling booth number 36 located in Koktal (Green Tree) village. By this time it was 1300 hour. School basketball indoor court was converted into a polling booth which had 2354 registered votes. Polling booth Secretary Mr. Irbul Islamovich Irgebayev told us that 720 voters had exercised their franchise. It was nice to see half of the basket ball court was full with voters. People were waiting for their turn to come. This was like any polling day in Indian rural area. The only difference was that temperature was minus 10 centigrade. Despite such cold weather people were very enthusiastic and warm at heart to use their franchise. One difference seen here compare to other two polling booths (nos. 12 & 13 we visited) was that the electronic voting machines were not used at this booth and voters were very happy to use printed ballots.

Voting in progress at Polling Booth Number 36, Koktal, Astana City

 After warming ourselves with hot food we decided to proceed to polling booth number 157 in Astana City. We arrived at this booth by 1500 h. This had 1271 registered voters and 602 voters had exercised their franchise by this time. Madam L. A. Kuznetsovna, 91 yrs old, World War II veteran came to exercise her vote. It was a treat to talk her and know about the past experiences of her. She was blessing everyone at the booth and praying for the well being of her country and wishing all the best for her leader Nursultan Nazarbayev.

Voting in Progress at Polling Booth Number 157, Astana City, Kazakhstan, Mrs. L A Kuznetsovna, 91 yrs old, (sitting on chair & facing camera) World War II veteran came to exercise her vote.

 Analysis:

1277 International Observers and 407 representatives from foreign media witnessed the Presidential Election in Kazakhstan at 9580 polling stations all over the country. Out of a total of 8,874,968 registered voters 6,850, 000 used their franchise in this election, which means more than 77 percent came to cast their vote. Nursultan Nazarbayev got 91.01 percent of the total votes polled while his rival Zharmakhan Tuyakbai leader of “For a Fair Kazakhstan Movement” got 445,047 i. e. 6.64 percent of the total votes polled. Other three candidates performed very poorly. With this landslide victory, Nursultan Nazarbayev would lead his country for another seven years.

 Based on our observations at the polling booths we visited, interactions with the representatives of all candidates at these polling booths, Kazakhs voters (academicians, journalists, farmers, intellectual & politicians) and foreign observers who came to monitor Presidential Election in Kazakhstan, we can say that Presidential election in Kazakhstan  was free, fair, transparent and accurate.

 Why Nursultan Nazarbayev got such a thumping majority? Nursultan Nazarbayev’s victory can be attributed to his ability to maintain stability, inter ethnic harmony and success of economic reforms in Kazakhstan. He got support from all over country north, south, east and west. All nationalities overwhelmingly voted for him. Even in the Kyzylorda region, home base of his main opponent Zharmakhan Tuyakbay, voters’ supported Nursultan Nazarbayev. He succeeded in reaching out to voters and convincing them about his economic and political reforms. He could successfully convey to electorate that his economic reforms are aimed at eliminating poverty, raising the living standard and taking Kazakhstan further in today’s global economy. In his address to the Nation on September 1, 2005 he spelt out his plan of expanding and strengthening democracy at all level. Contrary to this his opponents failed to coordinate their strategy and reaching out to masses. Also opposition was divided house which went in favour of Nursultan Nazarbayev. The main opposition leader Zharmakhan Tuyakbay and Alikhan Baimenov, had nothing substantial to offer to voters. People expressed their faith in Nursultan Nazarbayev because they had seen his leadership and ability to guide their country while maintaining stability, inter ethnic harmony, fighting religious extremism and international terrorism. Presidential Election 2005 is a step forward towards ongoing democratic processes in Kazakhstan.

 Dr Ramakant Dwivedi
Strategic Analyst
Astana City, Kazakhstan
December 5, 2005