It is over four years since the International Coalition of Forces led by the United St

ates of America swept the Taliban regime out of power in Afghanistan. Since then the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) led by North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is engaged in promoting stability and security in the region. This has had a positive impact on all the Central Asian countries, especially on Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Here heightened militant activities by religious extremists and terrorists have posed serious security challenges to their integrity. Nevertheless, the military presence of the West in the region has changed the geopolitical map of Central Asia.

The United States has emerged as a powerful player in the region. Earlier Russia was the chief guarantor of stability and security in Central Asia. With religious extremism and terrorism acquiring global dimensions and the emergence of Afghanistan as the epicenter of extremism and terrorism, a global effort to fight this challenge became inevitable. Such an effort needed coordination and cooperation of all the States of the region and beyond. Russia extended full support and cooperation to Operation Enduring Freedom. Since Russia was facing challenges in Chechnya, Russia’s support was understandable. Similarly Russia’s assent to Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan granting military base facilities to the United States has played an important role. However, it was their expectations that such military presence would be limited to achieve the objective of defeating extremist and terrorist forces and a ‘short’ duration would be enough for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to complete its task. In the process, the United States’ involvement in Central Asia has deepened. Apart from the military base facilities at Manas in Kyrgyz Republic and Karshi-Khanabad (K-2) in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have also offered support to Washington.

Although Russia had acquiesced to United States’ military presence in Central Asia, an area of vital importance to it, there was unease and disquiet in many circles, especially among the Russian armed forces who felt that this presence would not be short and possibly had a secret agenda. The agenda could be controlling the energy resources of Central Asia and reducing Russian influence in the region. Such a perception is natural against the background of eastward expansion of NATO. After the Taliban was swept out of power and the Al-Qaeda ranks were largely and effectively decimated, the continued presence of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), on the plea that instability in Afghanistan requires their continuation, has attracted critical comments. The same argument is advanced for the United States’ military base in Kyrgyz Republic.

The May 13 ‘Unrest’ in Andijon

Andijon is next door to Kyrgyz Republic Osh and Jalalabad provinces where the successful March 2005 demonstrations against the Kyrgyz President, Asker Akayev, culminated in his flight to Moscow. The movement was christened the “Tulip Revolution”. Some analysts have suggested that the Tulip Revolution has cast its shadow, now, over the Uzbek part of the Ferghana Valley.  This appears to be an extrapolative leap from an inadequate database. However, the case for a continuous watch and study of developments is valid because Uzbekistan is a key country in the region and traumatic changes would have major geo-political implications for Central Asia and its neighbouring regions.

Uzbekistan has been witnessing clashes between secular and extremist forces since its independence from the erstwhile Soviet Union in 1991. Some Central Asian watchers hold the view that political deprivation, the deteriorating economic conditions, corruption, drop in living standards, mass unemployment, and failures on the part of the Uzbek government to address these problems have enabled religious extremism to germinate. One may agree partially with this generalisation. However, one finds it difficult to understand why Hizb e-Tahrir and the Islamic Movement of Turkestan have been trying to establish a Caliphate undermining the secualar fabric of the region and also challenging the constitutional system. The main demands of the Hizb e-Tahrir and the Islamic Movement of Turkestan are:

  • Return to the basic principles and commandments of Islam, purification of Islam of all later heresies and distractions;
  • A political system based on Hakimiya and caliphate;
  • Regulation of economy on the basis of various “Islamic economy” theories;
  • Organisation of legal system within the framework of Shari’a, with administration of justice taking the priority over legislative and executive power.

In general, the people of Central Asian Republics do not believe that the establishment of a Caliphate would lead to resolution of all the socio-politico-economic problems. They are aware that the appeal to the ‘glorious’ past of Islam has not enabled the building of modern nation-states.

There is persuasive information/evidence that the protesters in Andijon received active support and guidance from outside Uzbekistan. The territory of neighbouring countries was used for planning and execution. Forces from the Islamic Movement of Turkistan (IMT), earlier known as Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and located in Pakistan and Afghanistan, were an integral part of the plan while Hizb-e-Tahrir and the Akromilar gave active support from Andijon. The Uzbek Jamoat (part of HUT) also played an important role in planning the attack on jail, government buildings and installations in Andijon City. Initially 20 mobile military groups were formed, each having 5- 20 members. They were later merged into six larger mobile military groups with assigned targets. Infiltration into Andijon Veloyat began on May 6, 2005 from the Dostlik Check post on the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border taking advantage of the rugged and mountainous region. The activities were well coordinated and persons with knowledge of military operations directed the “revolt”.

Why did the “terrorists” choose May 13? It was a Friday, the main day of public prayer, and the “terrorists” appear to have believed that they could rally popular support by linking their action to a religious cause and further strengthened by the freeing of imprisoned members of the banned Islamist Akramiya movement. However, local Andijonians refused to support such “terrorist” actions. The chief of the ’Devanboy’ mosque in Andijon said, “Akram Yuldoshev, (leader of the Akromilar), doesn’t know much about Islam. We are followers of Imam Hanifa and don’t believe in extremist ideas. However, Akram wants to achieve his political objective by using religion as a tool.”  Akromilar is one of the branches of Hizb-e-Tahrir which wants to create a Caliphate in Central Asia comprising Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Mongolistan and Uzbekistan.” Akram Yuldoshev (leader of the Akromilar) who was born in 1960 in Bagh-e- Shimol area of Andijon City, was arrested in 1999 and put in Navoi jail.

As far as Islamic practices are concerned, the government supports them with a benign hand. It may be noted that Andijon Veloyat (Province) has 181 mosques while Andijon city has 20 mosques. There is one madrassa in the Veloyat. In 2005, eight hundred people had performed the Haj pilgrimage from Andijon province.

There are two streams in the Islamic revival movements in Uzbekistan. One is moderately radical and the other “ultra radical.” Both want to establish an Islamic state under Shari’a law. The Hizb–e-Tahrir is said to have chosen ‘peaceful’ political means to accomplish this aim; while the Tovba, Adolat, Islam lashkarlari, Nur and Islamic Movement of Turkistan (IMT) have embraced non-peaceful methods.

There is consensus that Islamic extremist elements belonging to the Taliban, Hizb -e-Tahrir, and Islamic Movement of Turkistan (IMT) pose a serious threat to peace and stability in Central Asia. They have access to foreign financial and material support out of narco-dollars and small arms trade in the region. Some Islamic countries have extended financial and ideological support to these elements.

In general, Western countries desire to see Western style democracy and civil society in the former Soviet Union republics. This is not appreciated by Central Asian people. Though democratisation of Central Asia is desirable goal, its imposition from outside would create instabilities in Central Asia. A number of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working for the promotion of democracy and civil society in Central Asia states are funded by the West. Their role has come under a cloud after “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyz Republic and “Andijon Unrest”.

This brings into focus the involvement of Western countries in the ongoing political processes in Central Asian Republics.

The international non-official reaction to the violence in Andijon was largely shaped by sensational media reports which portrayed the incident as a massacre of innocent civilians. Very little mention was made of the fact that the insurgents were well armed and that they had quite clearly planned the event as a precise military operation. However, official reactions from most of the countries (including Russia) were in support of the Karimov government. The Russian Foreign Ministry said the government condemns the actions of extremists and highlighted the Uzbek-Russia “strategic partnership”. Minister Lavrov said, “I do not think any country will tolerate foreign forces seizing arms depots, staging violence, raiding administrative buildings and taking hostages on its territory,” Clearly, Moscow is unlikely to be a silent spectator in Central Asia. It is worth noting that Uzbekistan’s neighbours (Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan) have held religious extremists and terrorists responsible for the unrest in Andijon. White House spokesman Scott McClellan said, “The people of Uzbekistan want to see a more representative and democratic government. But that should come through peaceful means, not through violence.”

Phrases like the “Tulip Revolution” and “Unrest in Andijon” are likely to influence the geopolitics of Central Asia in time to come. The summit meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) held in Astana on July 5-6, 2005 also draws attention to these events. The summit’s call on the US-led “anti-terrorist coalition” to define a deadline on its military presence on the territory of SCO member countries is a strong signal to be noted in this regard. Initially Washington tried to deflect SCO’s call by claiming that it was guided by bilateral agreements with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyz Republic. However, Uzbek officials notified the United States July 31, 2005 that US forces would have six months to vacate the Karshi-Khanabad (K-2) air base, located 90 miles north of the Afghanistan border. United States’ military flew its last plane out from K-2 on Monday November 21, 2005. This is a noteworthy shift in the Uzbekistan-United States ties.

Kyrgyz Republic then Foreign Minister Roza Otunbayeva also joined issue with Washington. She said, “All of us are part of the anti-terrorist coalition, including our country. However, there is a time limit for everybody who comes to stay somewhere. We are members of the SCO. We raised this issue together with other member states.” Kurman Bakiyev who was elected the New Kyrgyz President on July 10, 2005, had expressed doubts about the need for United States presence at Manas. He told reporters on July 11, 2005, “This issue was raised at the SCO summit, since the situation in Afghanistan has changed. The situation in Afghanistan will soon stabilize. The country has had presidential elections, so the question about the coalition base’s presence in Kyrgyz Republic arises.”

The Russia-Uzbekistan “Treaty of Alliance Relations” signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Uzbek President Islam Abduganievich Karimov in Moscow on November 14, 2005 signifies Uzbekistan’s return to the Russian orbit. “The Treaty of Alliance Relations” provides Russia a new opportunity to assist Uzbekistan in security related matters. This Treaty need to be looked in the context of Andijon incident and also ‘Strategic Partnership Agreement’ which Moscow and Tashkent signed on June 16, 2004. Article 2 of the Uzbek-Russia Treaty of November 14, 2005 stipulates that: “If an act of aggression is committed against one of the sides by any state or group of states, this will be viewed as an act of aggression against both sides. The other side will provide necessary assistance, including military assistance, as well as giving aid through other means at its disposal.”  It appears as though the United States tilt in the region has received a course correction especially in security matters.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is an important initiative of June 2002. The agenda of the SCO has expanded from peace making on borders to security and economic cooperation. Several security related structures have been created such as Anti-Terrorism Centre in Tashkent. The SCO has emerged as a proactive regional grouping and is confident to address regional issues. The most visible changes in the security scenario were apparent at the Astana Summit meeting of the SCO in July 2005. The SCO member countries asked the United States of America and its allies to announce a time frame for withdrawal of their military presence from the Karshi-Khanabad (K-2) military base in Uzbekistan and Manas military base in Kyrgyz Republic. Following the SCO Summit and lifting of 539 Uzbek refugee by the United Nations from Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan government took the decisive step asking United States to vacate K-2. In November 2005, the last contingent of the Unite States military left Uzbekistan. This clearly shows that Central Asian countries are coming close to Russia and China in economic and security arrangements. They have joined hands with Russian and China to counter the United States’ moves in the region. Russia and China have both strategic and economic stakes in Central Asia. It appears that there is increasing understanding between Moscow and Beijing to insure peace and stability in the region in order to keep the United States out. China-Russia joint military exercises during August 18-25, 2005 near Russia’s far-east port city of Vladivostok and near Chinese province of Shandong and Yellow Sea is a clear signal to this. American presence in Central Asia is a challenge to Russian and Chinese energy security and stability.

Of equal importance is the Collective Security Treat Organisation (CSTO), whose objectives are similar to that of the SCO but lays greater emphasise on military aspects. It is under this umbrella thatRussia has access to Kant military base in Kyrgyz Republic. Russia also has two other bases in Tajikistan. Reports suggest that it may acquire another base in Kyrgyz Republic, at Osh. It is clear that Russia has steadily increased its military presence in Central Asia after the initial readjustment of 1989-90. It is worth noting that United States in Central Asia is tied to a specific task. Russia’s re-engagement appears to be broad based. There is a strong possibility that Uzbekistan may join the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). Secondly the Karshi-Khanabad (K-2) base could be offered to Russian. Thus we see Western presence in Manas in Kyrgyz Republic and Afghanistan, while Russian has established a strong military presence in Central Asia. Once again the geopolitical map is being re-drawn.

In the final analysis, religious extremism and international terrorism would remain challenges to Central Asian security and stability. The insurgency in Iraq against the American forces and its “successes” may be expected to give a fillip to such forces in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Imaginative and creative initiatives by the governments in Central Asian Republics are needed to improve the economic conditions and weaken the appeal of religious extremism.

The local population (except a sizeable number in Namangan, Andijon and Ferghana provinces) is not in favour of radical Islam. However, they are not capable of resisting Islamic prohibitions when imposed.

As far as the issue of democratisation is concerned, one should welcome emergence of genuine political opposition in Central Asia, however, no external prescriptions are desirable. The Indian democratic experience and liberalisation after 1991 could be of value to Central Asian Republics. Human Rights, civil society and democracy are perceived locally as new instruments for perpetuating hegemony. Imposed from outside, these concepts are not likely to be successful. They have to be home grown and take account of local historical, social, economic and political processes.